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Abstract Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal
reasoning about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among
rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and techniques
focus on turn-based games, where each state of the game is controlled by a single
player, and on zero-sum properties, where two players or coalitions have directly
opposing objectives. In this paper, we present automated verification techniques
for concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which provide a more natural model
of concurrent decision making and interaction. We also consider (social welfare)
Nash equilibria, to formally identify scenarios where two players or coalitions with
distinct goals can collaborate to optimise their joint performance. We propose an
extension of the temporal logic rPATL for specifying quantitative properties in this
setting and present corresponding algorithms for verification and strategy synthe-
sis for a variant of stopping games. For finite-horizon properties the computation
is exact, while for infinite-horizon it is approximate using value iteration. For zero-
sum properties it requires solving matrix games via linear programming, and for
equilibria-based properties we find social welfare or social cost Nash equilibria of
bimatrix games via the method of labelled polytopes through an SMT encoding.
We implement this approach in PRISM-games, which required extending the tool’s
modelling language for CSGs, and apply it to case studies from domains including
robotics, computer security and computer networks, explicitly demonstrating the
benefits of both CSGs and equilibria-based properties.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic multi-player games are a versatile modelling framework for systems that
exhibit cooperative or competitive behaviour in the presence of adversarial or un-
certain environments. They can be viewed as a collection of players (agents) with
strategies for determining their actions based on the execution so far. These models
combine nondeterminism, representing the adversarial, cooperative and competitive
choices, stochasticity, modelling uncertainty due to noise, failures or randomness,
and concurrency, representing simultaneous execution of interacting agents. Ex-
amples of such systems appear in many domains, from robotics and autonomous
transport, to security and computer networks. A game-theoretic approach also
facilitates the design of protocols that use penalties or incentives to ensure ro-
bustness against selfish participants. However, the complex interactions involved
in such systems make their correct construction a challenge.
Formal verification for stochastic games provides a means of producing quanti-
tative guarantees on the correctness of these systems (e.g. “the control software can
always safely stop the vehicle with probability at least 0.99, regardless of the ac-
tions of other road users”), where the required behavioural properties are specified
precisely in quantitative extensions of temporal logic. The closely related problem
of strategy synthesis constructs an optimal strategy for a player, or coalition of
players, which guarantees that such a property is satisfied.
A variety of verification algorithms for stochastic games have been devised,
e.g., [17,77,3,4,18]. In recent years, further progress has been made: verification
and strategy synthesis algorithms have been developed for various temporal log-
ics [23,9,45,42] and implemented in the PRISM-games tool [51], an extension of
the PRISM probabilistic model checker [44]. This has allowed modelling and veri-
fication of stochastic games to be used for a variety of non-trivial applications, in
which competitive or collaborative behaviour between entities is a crucial ingredi-
ent, including computer security and energy management.
A limitation of the techniques implemented in PRISM-games to date is that
they focus on turn-based stochastic multi-player games (TSGs), whose states are
partitioned among a set of players, with exactly one player taking control of each
state. In this paper, we propose and implement techniques for concurrent stochastic
multi-player games (CSGs), which generalise TSGs by permitting players to choose
their actions simultaneously in each state. This provides a more realistic model
of interactive agents operating concurrently, and making action choices without
already knowing the actions being taken by other agents. Although algorithms for
CSGs have been known for some time (e.g., [3,4,18]), their implementation and
application to real-world examples has been lacking.
A further limitation of existing work is that it focuses on zero-sum properties, in
which one player (or a coalition of players) aims to optimise some objective, while
the remaining players have the directly opposing goal. In PRISM-games, properties
are specified in the logic rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with
rewards) [23], a quantitative extension of the game logic ATL [5]. This allows us
to specify that a coalition of players can achieve a high-level objective, regarding
the probability of an event’s occurrence or the expectation of reward measure,
irrespective of the other players’ strategies. Extensions have allowed players to
optimise multiple objectives [24,9], but again in a zero-sum fashion.
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In this work, we move beyond zero-sum properties and consider situations
where two players (or two coalitions of players) in a CSG have distinct objectives
to be maximised or minimised. The goals of the players (or coalitions) are not
necessarily directly opposing, and so it may be beneficial for players to collaborate.
For these nonzero-sum scenarios, we use the well studied notion of Nash equilibria
(NE), where it is not beneficial for any player to unilaterally change their strategy.
In particular, we use subgame-perfect NE [63], where this equilibrium criterion
holds in every state of the game, and we focus on two specific variants of equilibria:
social welfare and social cost NE, which maximise and minimise, respectively, the
sum of the objectives of the players.
We propose an extension of the rPATL logic which adds the ability to express
quantitative nonzero-sum properties based on these notions of equilibria, for ex-
ample “the two robots have navigation strategies which form a (social cost) Nash
equilibrium, and under which the combined expected energy usage until complet-
ing their tasks is below k”. We also include some additional reward properties that
have proved to be useful when applying our methods to various case studies.
We provide a formal semantics for the new logic and propose algorithms for
CSG verification and strategy synthesis for a variant of stopping games, including
both zero-sum and nonzero-sum properties. Our algorithms extend the existing
approaches for rPATL model checking, and employ a combination of exact com-
putation through backward induction for finite-horizon properties and approx-
imate computation through value iteration for infinite-horizon properties. Both
approaches require the solution of games for each state of the model in each iter-
ation of the computation: we solve matrix games for the zero-sum case and find
optimal NE for bimatrix games for the nonzero-sum case. The former can be done
with linear programming; we perform the latter using labelled polytopes [52] and
a reduction to SMT.
We have implemented our verification and strategy synthesis algorithms in a
new release, version 3.0, of PRISM-games [48], extending both the modelling and
property specification languages to support CSGs and nonzero-sum properties.
In order to investigate the performance, scalability and applicability of our tech-
niques, we have developed a large selection of case studies taken from a diverse set
of application domains including: finance, computer security, computer networks,
communication systems, robot navigation and power control.
These illustrate examples of systems whose modelling and analysis requires
stochasticity and competitive or collaborative behaviour between concurrent com-
ponents or agents. We demonstrate that our CSG modelling and verification tech-
niques facilitate insightful analysis of quantitative aspects of such systems. Specif-
ically, we show cases where CSGs allow more accurate modelling of concurrent
behaviour than their turn-based counterparts and where our equilibria-based ex-
tension of rPATL allows us to synthesise better performing strategies for collabo-
rating agents than can be achieved using the zero-sum version.
The paper combines and extends the conference papers [45] and [46]. In par-
ticular, we: (i) introduce the definition of social cost Nash equilibria for CSGs and
model checking algorithms for verifying temporal logic specifications using this
definition; (ii) provide additional details and proofs of model checking algorithms,
for example for combinations of finite- and infinite-horizon objectives; (iii) present
an expanded experimental evaluation, including a wider range of properties, ex-
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tended analysis of the case studies and a more detailed evaluation of performance,
including efficiency improvements with respect to [45,46].
Related work. Various verification algorithms have been proposed for CSGs,
e.g. [3,4,18], but without implementations, tool support or case studies. PRISM-
games 2.0 [51], which we have built upon in this work, provided modelling and
verification for a wide range of properties of stochastic multi-player games, in-
cluding those in the logic rPATL, and multi-objective extensions of it, but fo-
cusing purely on the turn-based variant of the model (TSGs) in the context of
two-coalitional zero-sum properties. GIST [21] allows the analysis of ω-regular
properties on probabilistic games, but again focuses on turn-based, not concur-
rent, games. GAVS+ [25] is a general-purpose tool for algorithmic game solving,
supporting TSGs and (non-stochastic) concurrent games, but not CSGs. Three
further tools, PRALINE [14], EAGLE [76] and EVE [34], support the computa-
tion of NE [58] for the restricted class of (non-stochastic) concurrent games. In
addition, EVE has recently been extended to verify if an LTL property holds on
some or all NE [35]. Computing NE is also supported by MCMAS-SLK [16] via
strategy logic and general purpose tools such as Gambit [57] can compute a variety
of equilibria but, again, not for stochastic games.
Work concerning nonzero-sum properties includes [22,77], in which the exis-
tence of and the complexity of finding NE for stochastic games is studied, but
without practical algorithms. The complexity of finding subgame-perfect NE for
quantitative reachability properties is studied in [15], while [33] considers the com-
plexity of equilibrium design for temporal logic properties and lists social welfare
requirements and implementation as future work. In [67], a learning-based algo-
rithm for finding NE for discounted properties of CSGs is presented and evaluated.
Similarly, [53] studies NE for discounted properties and introduces iterative algo-
rithms for strategy synthesis. A theoretical framework for price-taking equilibria
of CSGs is given in [6], where players try to minimise their costs which include a
price common to all players and dependent on the decisions of all players. A notion
of strong NE for a restricted class of CSGs is formalised in [27] and an approxi-
mation algorithm for checking the existence of such NE for discounted properties
is introduced and evaluated. The existence of stochastic equilibria with imprecise
deviations for CSGs and a PSPACE algorithm to compute such equilibria is con-
sidered in [12]. Finally, we mention the fact that the concept of equilibrium is used
to analyze different applications such as cooperation among agents in stochastic
games [39] and to design protocols based on quantum secret sharing [69].
2 Preliminaries
We begin with some basic background from game theory, and then describe CSGs,
illustrating each with examples. For any finite set X, we will write Dist(X) for the
set of probability distributions over X and for any vector v ∈ Qn for n ∈ N we use
v(i) to denote the ith entry of the vector.
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2.1 Game Theory Concepts
We first introduce normal form games, which are simple one-shot games where
players make their choices concurrently.
Definition 1 (Normal form game) A (finite, n-person) normal form game (NFG)
is a tuple N = (N,A, u) where:
– N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
– A = A1 × · · · × An and Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i ∈ N ;
– u = (u1, . . . , un) and ui : A→ Q is a utility function for player i ∈ N .
In a game N, players select actions simultaneously, with player i ∈ N choosing
from the action set Ai. If each player i selects action ai, then player j receives the
utility uj(a1, . . . , an).
Definition 2 (Strategies and strategy profile) A (mixed) strategy σi for player
i in an NFG N is a distribution over its action set, i.e., σi ∈ Dist(Ai). We let
ΣiN denote the set of all strategies for player i. A strategy profile (or just profile)
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a tuple of strategies for each player.
Under a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of an NFG N, the expected utility of
player i is defined as follows:
ui(σ)
def
=
∑
(a1,...,an)∈A
ui(a1, . . . , an) ·
(∏n
j=1 σj(aj)
)
.
A two-player NFG is also called a bimatrix game as it can be represented by two
distinct matrices Z1,Z2 ∈ Q
l×m where A1 = {a1, . . . , al}, A2 = {b1, . . . , bm}, z
1
ij =
u1(ai, bj) and z
2
ij = u2(ai, bj).
A two-player NFG is constant-sum if there exists c ∈ Q such that u1(α)+u2(α) =
c for all α ∈ A and zero-sum if c = 0. A zero-sum, two-player NFG is often
called a matrix game as it can be represented by a single matrix Z ∈ Ql×m where
A1 = {a1, . . . , al}, A2 = {b1, . . . , bm} and zij = u1(ai, bj) = −u2(ai, bj). For zero-
sum, two-player NFGs, in the bimatrix game representation we have Z1 = −Z2.
2.1.1 Matrix Games
We require the following classical result concerning matrix games, which introduces
the notion of the value of a matrix game (and zero-sum NFG).
Theorem 1 (Minimax theorem [59,60]) For any zero-sum NFG N = (N,A, u)
and corresponding matrix game Z, there exists v⋆ ∈ Q, called the value of the game
and denoted val(Z), such that:
– there is a strategy σ⋆1 for player 1, called an optimal strategy of player 1, such
that under this strategy the player’s expected utility is at least v⋆ regardless of the
strategy of player 2, i.e. infσ2∈Σ2N
u1(σ
⋆
1 , σ2) > v
⋆;
– there is a strategy σ⋆2 for player 2, called an optimal strategy of player 2, such that
under this strategy the player’s expected utility is at least −v⋆ regardless of the
strategy of player 1, i.e. infσ1∈Σ1N u2(σ1, σ
⋆
2) > −v
⋆.
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The value of a matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m can be found by solving the following linear
programming (LP) problem [59,60]. Maximise v subject to the constraints:
x1·z1j + · · ·+ xl·zlj > v for all 1 6 j 6 m
xi > 0 for all 1 6 i 6 l
x1 + · · ·+ xl = 1
In addition, the solution for (x1, . . . , xl) yields an optimal strategy for player 1.
The value of the game can also be found by solving the following dual LP problem.
Minimise v subject to the constraints:
y1·zi1 + · · ·+ ym·zim 6 v for all 1 6 i 6 l
yj > 0 for all 1 6 j 6 m
y1 + · · ·+ ym = 1
and in this case the solution (y1, . . . , ym) yields an optimal strategy for player 2.
Example 1. Consider the (zero-sum) NFG corresponding to the well known rock-
paper-scissors game, where each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses “rock” (ri), “paper” (pi)
or “scissors” (si). The matrix game representation is:
Z =


r2 p2 s2
r1 0 −1 1
p1 1 0 −1
s1 −1 1 0


where the utilities for winning, losing and drawing are 1, −1 and 0 respectively. The
value for this matrix game is the solution to the following LP problem. Maximise
v subject to the constraints:
x2 − x3 > v
x3 − x1 > v
x1 − x2 > v
x1, x2, x3 > 0
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
which yields the value v⋆ = 0 with optimal strategy σ⋆1 = (1/3,1/3, 1/3) for player
1 (the optimal strategy for player 2 is the same). 
2.1.2 Bimatrix Games
For bimatrix games (and nonzero-sum NFGs), we use the concept of Nash equilibria
(NE), which represent scenarios for players with distinct objectives in which it is
not beneficial for any player to unilaterally change their strategy. In particular, we
will use variants called social welfare optimal NE and social cost optimal NE. These
variants are equilibria that maximise or minimise, respectively, the total utility of
the players, i.e., the sum of the individual player utilities.
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Definition 3 (Best and least response) For NFG N = (N,A,u), strategy profile
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) and player i strategy σ
′
i, we define the sequence of strategies σ−i =
(σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) and profile σ−i[σ
′
i] = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ
′
i, σi+1, . . . , σn). For
player i and strategy sequence σ−i:
– a best response for player i to σ−i is a strategy σ
⋆
i for player i such that
ui(σ−i[σ
⋆
i ]) > ui(σ−i[σi]) for all strategies σi of player i;
– a least response for player i to σ−i is a strategy σ
⋆
i for player i such that
ui(σ−i[σ
⋆
i ]) 6 ui(σ−i[σi]) for all strategies σi of player i.
Definition 4 (Nash equilibrium) For NFG N = (N,A,u), a strategy profile σ⋆
of N is a Nash equilibrium (NE) and 〈ui(σ
⋆)〉i∈N NE values if σ
⋆
i is a best response
to σ⋆−i for all i ∈ N .
Definition 5 (Social welfare NE) For NFG N = (N,A, u), an NE σ⋆ of N is a
social welfare optimal NE (SWNE) and 〈ui(σ
⋆)〉i∈N corresponding SWNE values if
u1(σ
⋆)+ · · ·+un(σ⋆) > u1(σ)+ · · ·+un(σ) for all NE σ of N.
Definition 6 (Social cost NE) For NFG N = (N,A,u), a profile σ⋆ of N is a social
cost optimal NE (SCNE) and 〈ui(σ
⋆)〉i∈N corresponding SCNE values if it is an NE
of N− = (N,A,−u) and u1(σ
⋆)+ · · ·+un(σ
⋆) 6 u1(σ)+ · · ·+un(σ) for all NE σ of
N− = (N,A,−u).
The notion of SWNE is standard [61] and corresponds to the case where utility
values represent profits or rewards. We introduce the dual notion of SCNE for
the case where utility values correspond to losses or costs. In our experience of
modelling with stochastic games, such situations are common: example objectives
in this category include minimising the probability of a fault occurring or minimis-
ing the expected time to complete a task. Representing SCNE directly is a more
natural approach than the alternative of simply negating utilities, as above.
The following demonstrates the relationship between SWNE and SCNE.
Lemma 1 For NFG N = (N,A, u), a strategy profile σ⋆ of N is an NE of N− =
(N,A,−u) if and only if σ⋆i is a least response to σ
⋆
−i of player i in N for all i ∈ N .
Furthermore, σ⋆ is a SWNE of N− if and only if σ⋆ is a SCNE of N.
Lemma 1 can be used to reduce the computation of SCNE profiles and values to
those of SWNE profiles and values (or vice versa). This is achieved by negating
all utilities in the NFG or bimatrix game, computing an SWNE profile and corre-
sponding SWNE values, and then negating the SWNE values to obtain an SCNE
profile and corresponding SCNE values for the original NFG or bimatrix game.
Finding NE and NE values in bimatrix games is in the class of linear comple-
mentarity problems (LCPs). More precisely, (σ1, σ2) is an NE profile and (u, v)
are the corresponding NE values of the bimatrix game Z1,Z2 ∈ Q
l×m where
A1 = {a1, . . . , al}, A2 = {b1, . . . , bm} if and only if for the column vectors x ∈ Q
l
and y ∈ Qm where xi = σ1(ai) and yj = σ2(bj) for 1 6 i 6 l and 1 6 j 6 m, we
have:
xT (1u− Z1y) = 0 (1)
yT (1v − ZT2 x) = 0 (2)
1u− Z1y > 0 (3)
1v − ZT2 x > 0 (4)
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and 0 and 1 are vectors or matrices with all components 0 and 1, respectively.
Example 2. We consider a nonzero-sum stag hunt game [64] where, if players
decide to cooperate, this can yield a large utility, but if the others do not, then the
cooperating player gets nothing while the remaining players get a small utility. A
scenario with 3 players, where two form a coalition (assuming the role of player
2), yields a bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( nc2 hc2 c2
nc1 2 2 2
c1 0 4 6
)
Z2 =
( nc2 hc2 c2
nc1 4 2 0
c1 4 6 9
)
where nci and ci represent player 1 and coalition 2 not cooperating and cooperat-
ing, respectively, and hc2 represents half the players in the coalition cooperating.
A strategy profile σ∗ = ((x1, x2, x3), (y1, y2)) is an NE and (u, v) the corresponding
NE values of the game if and only if, from Eqn (1) and (2):
u·x1 − 2·x1·y1 − 2·x1·y2 − 2·x1·y3 + u·x2 − 4·x2·y2 − 6·x2·y3 = 0
v·y1 − 4·x1·y1 − 4·x2·y1 + v·y2 − 2·x1·y2 − 6·x2·y2 + v·y3 − 9·x2·y3 = 0
and, from Eqn (3) and (4):
u− 2·y1 − 2·y2 − 2·y3 > 0
u− 4·y2 − 6·y3 > 0
v − 4·x1 − 4·x2 > 0
v − 2·x1 − 6·x2 > 0
v − 9·x2 > 0 .
There are three solutions to this LCP problem which correspond to the following
NE profiles:
– player 1 and the coalition pick nc1 and nc2, respectively, with NE values (2,4);
– player 1 selects nc1 and c1 with probabilities 5/9 and 4/9 and the coalition
selects nc2 and c2 with probabilities 2/3 and 1/3, with NE values (2,4);
– player 1 and the coalition select c1 and c2, respectively, with NE values (6,9).
For instance, in the first case, neither player 1 nor the coalition believes the other
will cooperate: the best they can do is act alone. The third maximises the joint
utility and is the only SWNE profile, with corresponding SWNE values (6,9).
To find SCNE profiles and SCNE values for the same set of utility functions,
using Lemma 1 we can negate all the utilities of the players in the game and look
for NE profiles in the resulting bimatrix game; again, there are three:
– player 1 and the coalition select c1 and nc2, respectively, with NE values (0,−4);
– player 1 selects nc1 and c1 with probabilities 1/2 and 1/2 and the coalition
selects nc2 and hc2 with probabilities 1/2 and 1/2, with NE values (−2,−4);
– player 1 and the coalition select nc1 and c2, respectively, with NE values (−2,0).
The third is the only SCNE profile, with corresponding SCNE values (2,0). 
In this work, we compute the SWNE values for a bimatrix game (or, via
Lemma 1, the SCNE values) by first identifying all the NE values of the game. For
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this, we use the Lemke-Howson algorithm [52], which is based on the method of la-
belled polytopes [61]. Other well-known methods include those based on support enu-
meration [66] and regret minimisation [71]. Given a bimatrix game Z1,Z2 ∈ Q
l×m,
we denote the sets of deterministic strategies of players 1 and 2 by I = {1, . . . , l}
and M = {1, . . . , m} and define J = {l+1, . . . , l+m} by mapping j ∈M to l+j ∈ J.
A label is then defined as an element of I ∪ J. The sets of strategies for players 1
and 2 can be represented by:
X = {x ∈ Ql | (1x = 1) ∧ (x > 0)} and Y = {y ∈ Qm | (1y = 1) ∧ (y > 0)} .
The strategy set Y is then divided into regions Y (i) and Y (j) (polytopes) for i ∈ I
and j ∈ J such that Y (i) contains strategies for which the deterministic strategy
i of player 1 is a best response and Y (j) contain strategies which choose action j
with probability 0:
Y (i) = {y ∈ Y | ∀k ∈ I. Z1(i, :)y > Z1(k, :)y} and Y (j) = {y ∈ Y | yj−l = 0}
where Z1(i, :) is the ith row vector of Z1. A vector y is then said to have label k if
y ∈ Y (k), for k ∈ I∪J. The strategy set X is divided analogously into regions X(j)
and X(i) for j ∈ J and i ∈ I and a vector x has label k if x ∈ X(k), for k ∈ I ∪ J.
A pair of vectors (x, y) ∈ X×Y is completely labelled if the union of the labels of x
and y equals I ∪ J.
The NE profiles of the game are the vector pairs that are completely la-
belled [52,74]. The corresponding NE values can be computed through matrix-
vector multiplication. A SWNE profile and corresponding SWNE values can then
be found through an NE profile with NE values that maximise the sum.
2.2 Concurrent Stochastic Games
We now define concurrent stochastic games [73], where players repeatedly make
simultaneous choices over actions that update the game state probabilistically.
Definition 7 (Concurrent stochastic game) A concurrent stochastic multi-player
game (CSG) is a tuple G = (N,S, S¯, A,∆, δ,AP ,L) where:
– N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
– S is a finite set of states and S¯ ⊆ S is a set of initial states;
– A = (A1 ∪{⊥})× · · ·×(An ∪{⊥}) where Ai is a finite set of actions available to
player i ∈ N and ⊥ is an idle action disjoint from the set ∪ni=1Ai;
– ∆ : S → 2∪
n
i=1Ai is an action assignment function;
– δ : S×A→ Dist(S) is a probabilistic transition function;
– AP is a set of atomic propositions and L : S → 2AP is a labelling function.
A CSG G starts in an initial state s¯ ∈ S¯ and, when in state s, each player i ∈ N
selects an action from its available actions Ai(s)
def
= ∆(s) ∩ Ai if this set is non-
empty, and from {⊥} otherwise. Supposing each player i selects action ai, the state
of the game is updated according to the distribution δ(s, (a1, . . . , an)). A CSG is a
turn-based stochastic multi-player game (TSG) if for any state s there is precisely one
player i for which Ai(s) 6= {⊥}. Furthermore, a CSG is a Markov decision process
(MDP) if there is precisely one player i such that Ai(s) 6= {⊥} for all states s.
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A path pi of G is a sequence pi = s0
α0−−→ s1
α1−−→ · · · where si ∈ S, αi ∈ A and
δ(si, αi)(si+1) > 0 for all i > 0. We denote by pi(i) the (i+1)th state of pi, pi[i] the
action associated with the (i+1)th transition and, if pi is finite, last(pi) the final
state. The length of a path pi, denoted |pi|, is the number of transitions appearing
in the path. Let FPathsG and IPathsG (FPathsG,s and IPathsG,s) be the sets of
finite and infinite paths (starting in state s).
We augment CSGs with reward structures of the form r = (rA, rS), where
rA : S×A → Q is an action reward function (which maps each state and action
tuple pair to a rational value that is accumulated when the action tuple is selected
in the state) and rS : S → Q is a state reward function (which maps each state to a
rational value that is incurred when the state is reached). We allow both positive
and negative rewards; however, we will later impose certain restrictions to ensure
the correctness of our model checking algorithms.
A strategy for a player in a CSG resolves the player’s choices in each state. These
choices can depend on the history of the CSG’s execution and can be randomised.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 8 (Strategy) A strategy for player i in a CSG G is a function of
the form σi : FPathsG → Dist(Ai ∪ {⊥}) such that, if σi(pi)(ai) > 0, then ai ∈
Ai(last(pi)). We denote by Σ
i
G the set of all strategies for player i.
As for NFGs, a strategy profile for G is a tuple σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of strategies
for all players and, for player i and strategy σ′i, we define the sequence σ−i and
profile σ−i[σ
′
i] in the same way. For strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) and state s, we
let FPathsσG,s and IPaths
σ
G,s denote the finite and infinite paths from s under the
choices of σ. We can define a probability measure ProbσG,s over the infinite paths
IPathsσG,s [43]. This construction is based on first defining the probabilities for
finite paths from the probabilistic transition function and choices of the strategies
in the profile. More precisely, for a finite path pi = s0
α0−−→ s1
α1−−→ · · ·
αm−1
−−−−→ sm
where s0 = s, the probability of pi under the profile σ is defined by:
Pσ(pi)
def
=
∏m−1
j=0
((∏n
i=1 σi(αj(i))
)
· δ(sj , αj)(sj+1)
)
.
Next, for each finite path pi, we define the basic cylinder Cσ(pi) that consists of
all infinite paths in IPathsσG,s that have pi as a prefix. Finally, using properties
of cylinders, we can then construct the probability space (IPathsσG,s,F
σ
s ,Prob
σ
G,s),
where Fσs is the smallest σ-algebra generated by the set of basic cylinders {C
σ(pi) |
pi ∈ IPathsσG,s} and Prob
σ
G,s is the unique measure such that Prob
σ
G,s(C
σ(pi)) =
Pσ(pi) for all pi ∈ FPathsσG,s.
For random variable X : IPathsG → Q, we can then define for any profile σ and
state s the expected value EσG,s(X) of X in s with respect to σ. These random
variables X represent an objective (or utility function) for a player, which includes
both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon properties. Examples of finite-horizon prop-
erties include the probability of reaching a set of target states T within k steps or
the expected reward accumulated over k steps. These properties can be expressed
by the random variables:
X(pi) =
{
1 if pi(j) ∈ T for some j 6 k
0 otherwise
Y (pi) =
∑k−1
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
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s0
s1
{win1}
s2
{win2}
s3
{draw}
(r1, r2), (p1, p2), (s1, s2) (t1, t2)
(r1, s2), (p1, r2), (s1, p2) (s1, r2), (p1, s2), (r1, p2)
(t1, t2)
Fig. 1: Rock-paper-scissors CSG.
respectively. Examples of infinite-horizon properties include the probability of
reaching a target set T and the expected cumulative reward until reaching a target
set T (where paths that never reach the target have infinite reward), which can
be expressed by the random variables:
X(pi) =
{
1 if pi(j) ∈ T for some j ∈ N
0 otherwise
Y (pi) =
{∑kmin−1
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
if pi(j) ∈ T for some j ∈ N
∞ otherwise
where kmin = min{j ∈ N | pi(j) ∈ T}, respectively.
Let us first focus on zero-sum games, which are by definition two-player games.
As for NFGs (see Definition 1), for a two-player CSG G and a given objective X,
we can consider the case where player 1 tries to maximise the expected value of
X, while player 2 tries to minimise it. The above definition yields the value of G
with respect to X if it is determined, i.e., if the maximum value that player 1 can
ensure equals the minimum value that player 2 can ensure. Since the CSGs we
consider are finite state and finitely-branching, it follows that they are determined
for all the objectives we consider [55]. Formally we have the following.
Definition 9 (Determinacy and optimality) For a two-player CSG G and ob-
jective X, we say that G is determined with respect to X if, for any state s:
supσ1∈Σ1 infσ2∈Σ2 E
σ1,σ2
G,s (X) = infσ2∈Σ2 supσ1∈Σ1 E
σ1,σ2
G,s (X)
and call this the value of G in state s with respect to X, denoted valG(s,X).
Furthermore, a strategy σ⋆1 of player 1 is optimal with respect to X if we have
E
σ⋆1 ,σ2
G,s (X) > valG(s,X) for all s ∈ S and σ2 ∈ Σ
2 and a strategy of player 2 is
optimal with respect to X if E
σ1,σ
⋆
2
G,s (X) 6 valG(s,X) for all s ∈ S and σ1 ∈ Σ
1.
Example 3. Consider the (non-probabilistic) CSG shown in Figure 1 correspond-
ing to two players repeatedly playing the rock-paper-scissors game (see Example 1).
Transitions are labelled with action pairs, where Ai = {ri, pi, si, ti} for 1 6 i 6 2,
with ri, pi and si representing playing rock, paper and scissors, respectively, and
ti restarting the game. The CSG starts in state s0 and states s1, s2 and s3 are
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nt1,1
nt2,1
(t1, t2)
tr1,0
tr2,0
nt1,0
nt2,0
q
1−q
tr1,0
nt2,1
nt1,1
tr2,0
tr1,0
tr2,0
(t1, w2)
(w1, t2) (t1, w2)
(w1, t2)
(w1, w2)
(w1, w2)
(w1, w2)
(w1, w2)
(w1, w2)
(w1, w2)
Fig. 2: CSG model of a medium access control problem.
labelled with atomic propositions corresponding to when a player wins or there is
a draw in a round of the rock-paper-scissors game.
For the zero-sum objective to maximise the probability of reaching s1 before
s2, i.e. player 1 winning a round of the game before player 2, the value of the game
is 1/2 and the optimal strategy of each player i is to choose ri, pi and si, each
with probability 1/3 in state s0 and ti otherwise. 
For nonzero-sum CSGs, with an objective Xi for each player i, we will use NE,
which can be defined as for NFGs (see Definition 4). In line with the definition
of zero-sum optimality above (and because the model checking algorithms we will
later introduce are based on backward induction [72,60]), we restrict our attention
to subgame-perfect NE [63], which are NE in every state of the CSG.
Definition 10 (Subgame-perfect NE) For CSG G, a strategy profile σ⋆ is a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for objectives 〈Xi〉i∈N if and only if E
σ⋆
G,s(Xi) >
supσi∈Σi E
σ⋆−i[σi]
G,s (Xi) for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
Furthermore, because we use a variety of objectives, including infinite-horizon
objectives, where the existence of NE is an open problem [11], we will in some
cases use ε-NE, which do exist for any ε > 0 for all the properties we consider.
Definition 11 (Subgame-perfect ε-NE) For CSG G and ε > 0, a strategy profile
σ⋆ is a subgame-perfect ε-Nash equilibrium for objectives 〈Xi〉i∈N if and only if
Eσ
⋆
G,s(Xi) > supσi∈Σi E
σ⋆−i[σi]
G,s (Xi)− ε for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
Example 4. In [14] a non-probabilistic concurrent game is used to model medium
access control. Two users with limited energy share a wireless channel and choose
to transmit (ti) or wait (wi) and, if both transmit, the transmissions fail due to
interference. We extend this to a CSG by assuming that transmissions succeed
with probability q if both transmit. Figure 2 presents a CSG model of the protocol
where each user has enough energy for one transmission. The states are labelled
with the status of each user, where the first value represents if the user i has
transmitted or not transmitted their message (tr i and nt i respectively) and the
second if there is sufficient energy to transmit or not (1 and 0 respectively).
If the objectives are to maximise the probability of a successful transmission,
there are two subgame-perfect SWNE profiles, one when user 1 waits for user 2 to
Automatic Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Systems 13
transmit before transmitting and another when user 2 waits for user 1 to transmit
before transmitting. Under both profiles, both users successfully transmit with
probability 1. If the objectives are to maximise the probability of being one of
the first to transmit, then there is only one SWNE profile corresponding to both
users immediately trying to transmit. In this case the probability of each user
successfully transmitting is q. 
3 Property Specification: Extending the Logic rPATL
In order to formalise properties of CSGs, we propose an extension of the logic
rPATL, previously defined for zero-sum properties of TSGs [23]. In particular, we
add operators to specify nonzero-sum properties, using (social welfare or social
cost) Nash equilibria, and provide a semantics for this extended logic on CSGs.
Definition 12 (Extended rPATL syntax) The syntax of our extended version
of rPATL is given by the grammar:
φ := true | a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] | 〈〈C〉〉R
r
∼x[ ρ ] | 〈〈C:C
′〉〉opt∼x(θ)
ψ := Xφ | φ U6k φ | φ U φ
ρ := I=k | C6k | F φ
θ := P[ψ ]+P[ψ ] | Rr[ ρ ]+Rr[ ρ ]
where a is an atomic proposition, C and C′ are coalitions of players such that
C′ = N\C, opt ∈ {min,max}, ∼∈ {<,6,>, >}, q ∈ Q ∩ [0,1], x ∈ Q, r is a reward
structure and k ∈ N.
rPATL is a branching-time temporal logic for stochastic games, which combines
the probabilistic operator P of PCTL [38], PRISM’s reward operator R [44], and
the coalition operator 〈〈C〉〉 of ATL [5]. The syntax distinguishes between state (φ),
path (ψ) and reward (ρ) formulae. State formulae are evaluated over states of a
CSG, while path and reward formulae are both evaluated over paths.
The core operators from the existing version of rPATL [23] are 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ]
and 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ]. A state satisfies a formula 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] if the coalition of players
C can ensure that the probability of the path formula ψ being satisfied is ∼q,
regardless of the actions of the other players (N\C) in the game. A state satisfies
a formula 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ] if the players in C can ensure that the expected value of the
reward formula ρ for reward structure r is ∼x, whatever the other players do. Such
properties are inherently zero-sum in nature as one coalition tries to maximise an
objective (e.g., the probability of ψ) and the other tries to minimise it; hence, we
call these zero-sum formulae.
The most significant extension we make to the rPATL logic is the addition of
nonzero-sum formulae. These take the form 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ), where C and C′ are
two coalitions that represent a partition of the set of players N , and θ is the sum
of either two probabilistic or two reward objectives. Their meaning is as follows:
– 〈〈C:C′〉〉max∼x(θ) is satisfied if there exists a subgame-perfect SWNE profile
between coalitions C and C′ under which the sum of the objectives of C and
C′ in θ is ∼x;
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– 〈〈C:C′〉〉min∼x(θ) is satisfied if there exists a subgame-perfect SCNE profile be-
tween coalitions C and C′ under which the sum of the objectives of C and C′
in θ is ∼x.
Like the existing zero-sum formulae, the new nonzero-sum formulae still split the
players into just two coalitions, C and C′ = N\C. This means that the model
checking algorithm (see Section 4) reduces to finding equilibria in two-player CSGs,
which is more tractable than for larger numbers of players. Technically, therefore,
we could remove the second coalition C′ from the syntax. However, we retain it
for clarity about which coalition corresponds to each of the two objectives, and to
allow a later extension to more than two coalitions [47].
Both types of formula, zero-sum and nonzero-sum, are composed of path (ψ)
and reward (ρ) formulae, used in probabilistic and reward objectives included
within P and R operators, respectively. For path formulae, we follow the exist-
ing rPATL syntax from [23] and allow next (Xφ), bounded until (φ U6k φ) and un-
bounded until (φ U φ). We also allow the usual equivalences such as F φ ≡ true U φ
(i.e., probabilistic reachability) and F6k φ ≡ true U6k φ (i.e., bounded probabilistic
reachability).
For reward formulae, we introduce some differences with respect to [23]. We
allow instantaneous (state) reward at the kth step (instantaneous reward I=k),
reward accumulated over k steps (bounded cumulative reward C6k), and reward ac-
cumulated until a formula φ is satisfied (expected reachability F φ). The first two,
adapted from the property specification language of PRISM [44], were not previ-
ously included in rPATL, but proved to be useful for the case studies we present
later in Section 7.2. For the third (F φ), [23] defines several variants, which differ
in the treatment of paths that never reach a state satisfying φ. We restrict our
attention to the most commonly used one, which is the default in PRISM, where
paths that never satisfy φ have infinite reward. In the case of zero-sum formulae,
adding the additional variants is straightforward based on the algorithm of [23].
On the other hand, for nonzero-sum formulae, currently no algorithms exist for
these variants.
As for other probabilistic temporal logics, it is useful to consider numerical
queries, which represent the value of an objective, rather than checking whether
it is above or below some threshold. In the case of zero-sum formulae, these
take the form 〈〈C〉〉Pmin=?[ψ ], 〈〈C〉〉Pmax=?[ψ ], 〈〈C〉〉R
r
min=?[ ρ ] and 〈〈C〉〉R
r
max=?[ ρ ].
For nonzero-sum formulae, numerical queries are of the form 〈〈C:C′〉〉max=?[θ] and
〈〈C:C′〉〉min=?[θ] which return the SWNE and SCNE values, respectively.
Example 5. Consider a scenario in which two robots (rbt1 and rbt2) move concur-
rently over a square grid of cells, where each is trying to reach their individual goal
location. Each step of the robot involves transitioning to an adjacent cell, possibly
stochastically. Examples of zero-sum formulae, where crash, goal1, goal2 denote the
obvious atomic propositions labelling states, include:
– 〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[¬crash U
610 goal1 ] asks what is the maximum probability with
which the first robot can ensure that it reaches its goal location within 10 steps
and without crashing, no matter how the second robot behaves;
– 〈〈rbt2〉〉R
rcrash
61.5 [ F goal2 ] states that, no matter the behaviour of the first robot,
the second robot can ensure the expected number of times it crashes before
reaching its goal is less than or equal to 1.5 (rcrash is a reward structure that
assigns 1 to states labelled crash and 0 to all other states).
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Examples of nonzero-sum formulae include:
– 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max>2(P[ F goal1 ]+P[¬crash U
610goal2 ]) states the robots can col-
laborate so that both reach their goal with probability 1, with the additional
condition that the second has to reach its goal within 10 steps without crashing;
– 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉min=?(R
rsteps [ F goal1 ]+R
rsteps [ F goal2 ]) asks what is the sum of ex-
pected reachability values when the robots collaborate and each wants to min-
imise their expected steps to reach their goal (rsteps is a reward structure that
assigns 1 to all state and action tuple pairs).
Examples of more complex nested formulae for this scenario include the following,
where rsteps is as above:
– 〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[ F 〈〈rbt2〉〉R
rsteps
>10 [ F goal2 ] ] asks what is the maximum probability
with which the first robot can get to a state where the expected time for the
second robot to reach their goal is at least 10 steps;
– 〈〈rbt1, rbt2〉〉P>0.75[ F 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉min65(R
rsteps [ F goal1 ]+R
rsteps [ F goal2 ]) ] states the
robots can collaborate to reach, with probability at least 0.75, a state where
the sum of the expected time for the robots to reach their goals is at most 5.

Before giving the semantics of the logic, we define coalition games which, for a
CSG G and coalition (set of players) C ⊆ N , reduce G to a two-player CSG GC ,
with one player representing C and the other N\C. Without loss of generality we
assume the coalition of players is of the form C = {1, . . . , n′}.
Definition 13 (Coalition game) For CSG G = (N,S, s¯, A,∆, δ,AP ,L) and coali-
tion C = {1, . . . , n′} ⊆ N , the coalition game GC = ({1,2}, S, s¯, AC ,∆C , δC ,AP ,L)
is a two-player CSG where:
– AC = (AC1 ∪ {⊥})×(A
C
2 ∪ {⊥});
– AC1 = (A1 ∪ {⊥})× · · ·×(An′ ∪ {⊥}) \ {(⊥, . . . ,⊥)};
– AC2 = (An′+1 ∪ {⊥})× · · ·×(An ∪ {⊥}) \ {(⊥, . . . ,⊥)};
– aC1 = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ ∆
C(s) if and only if either ∆(s) ∩ Aj = ∅ and aj = ⊥ or
aj ∈ ∆(s) for all 1 6 j 6 m and a
C
2 = (am+1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆
C(s) if and only if
either ∆(s) ∩ Aj = ∅ and aj = ⊥ or aj ∈ ∆(s) for all m+ 1 6 j 6 n for s ∈ S;
– for any s ∈ S, aC1 ∈ A
C
1 and a
C
2 ∈ A
C
2 we have δ
C(s, (aC1 , a
C
2 )) = δ(s, (a1, a2))
where ai = (⊥, . . . ,⊥) if a
C
i = ⊥ and ai = a
C
i otherwise for 1 6 i 6 2.
Furthermore, for a reward structure r = (rA, rS) of G, by abuse of notation we
also use r for the corresponding reward structure r = (rCA , r
C
S ) of G
C where:
– for any s ∈ S, aC1 ∈ A
C
1 and a
C
2 ∈ A
C
2 we have r
C
A(s, (a
C
1 , a
C
2 )) = rA(s, (a1, a2))
where ai = (⊥, . . . ,⊥) if a
C
i = ⊥ and ai = a
C
i otherwise for 1 6 i 6 2;
– for any s ∈ S we have rCS (s) = rS(s).
Our logic includes both finite-horizon (X , U6k, I=k, C6k) and infinite-horizon (U, F)
temporal operators. For the latter, the existence of SWNE or SCNE profiles is an
open problem [11], but we can check for ε-SWNE or ε-SCNE profiles for any ε.
Hence, we define the semantics of the logic in the context of a particular ε.
Definition 14 (Extended rPATL semantics) For a CSG G, ε > 0 and a formula
φ in our rPATL extension, we define the satisfaction relation |= inductively over
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the structure of φ. The propositional logic fragment (true, a, ¬, ∧) is defined in
the usual way. For a zero-sum formula and state s ∈ S of CSG G, we have:
s |= 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] ⇔ ∃σ1 ∈ Σ
1.∀σ2 ∈ Σ
2.Eσ1,σ2
GC ,s
(Xψ) ∼ q
s |= 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ] ⇔ ∃σ1 ∈ Σ
1.∀σ2 ∈ Σ
2.Eσ1,σ2
GC ,s
(Xr,ρ) ∼ x
For a nonzero-sum formula and state s ∈ S of CSG G, we have:
s |= 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ) ⇔ ∃σ
⋆
1 ∈ Σ
1, σ⋆2 ∈ Σ
2.
(
E
σ⋆1 ,σ
⋆
2
GC ,s
(Xθ1 ) + E
σ⋆1 ,σ
⋆
2
GC ,s
(Xθ2 )
)
∼ x
where (σ⋆1, σ
⋆
2) is a subgame-perfect ε-SWNE profile if opt = max, or a subgame-
perfect ε-SCNE profile if opt = min, for the objectives (Xθ1 , X
θ
2 ) in G
C . For an
objective Xψ, Xr,ρ or Xθi (1 6 i 6 2), and path pi ∈ IPathsGC ,s:
Xψ(pi) = 1 if pi |=ψ and 0 otherwise
Xr,ρ(pi) = rew(r, ρ)(pi)
X
P[ψ1 ]+P[ψ2 ]
i (pi) = 1 if pi |=ψ
i and 0 otherwise
X
R
r1 [ ρ1 ]+Rr2 [ ρ2 ]
i (pi) = rew(ri, ρ
i)(pi)
For a temporal formula and path pi ∈ IPathsGC ,s:
pi |= Xφ ⇔ pi(1) |=φ
pi |= φ1 U
6k φ2 ⇔ ∃i 6 k. (pi(i) |=φ2 ∧ ∀j < i. pi(j) |=φ1)
pi |= φ1 U φ2 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N. (pi(i) |=φ2 ∧ ∀j < i. pi(j) |=φ1)
For a reward structure r, reward formula and path pi ∈ IPathsGC ,s:
rew(r,I=k)(pi) = rS(pi(k))
rew(r,C6k)(pi) =
∑k−1
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
rew(r,F φ)(pi) =
{
∞ if ∀j ∈ N. pi(j) 6|=φ∑kφ−1
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
otherwise
where kφ = min{k | pi(k) |=φ}.
Using the notation above, we can also define the numerical queries mentioned
previously. For example, for state s we have:
〈〈C〉〉Pmin=?[ψ ]
def
= infσ1∈Σ1GC
supσ2∈Σ2GC
E
σ1,σ2
GC ,s
(Xψ)
〈〈C〉〉Pmax=?[ψ ]
def
= supσ1∈Σ1GC
infσ2∈Σ2GC
E
σ1,σ2
GC ,s
(Xψ) .
As the zero-sum objectives appearing in the logic are either finite-horizon or
infinite-horizon and correspond to either probabilistic until or expected reacha-
bility formulae, we have that CSGs are determined (see Definition 9) with respect
to these objectives [55], and therefore values exist. More precisely, for any CSG G,
coalition C, state s, path formula ψ, reward structure r and reward formula ρ, the
values valGC (s,X
ψ) and valGC (s,X
r,ρ) of the game GC in state s with respect to
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the objectives Xψ and Xr,ρ are well defined. This determinacy result also yields
the following equivalences:
〈〈C〉〉Pmax=?[ψ ] ≡ 〈〈N\C〉〉Pmin=?[ψ ] and 〈〈C〉〉R
r
max=?[ ρ ] ≡ 〈〈N\C〉〉R
r
min=?[ ρ ] .
Also, as for other probabilistic temporal logics, we can represent negated path for-
mulae by inverting the probability threshold, e.g.: 〈〈C〉〉P>q[¬ψ ] ≡ 〈〈C〉〉P61−q[ψ ]
and 〈〈C:C′〉〉max>q(P[ψ1 ]+P[ψ2 ]) ≡ 〈〈C:C
′〉〉min62−q(P[¬ψ1 ]+P[¬ψ2 ]), notably al-
lowing the ‘globally’ operator G φ ≡ ¬(F ¬φ) to be defined.
4 Model Checking for Extended rPATL against CSGs
We now present model checking algorithms for the extended rPATL logic, intro-
duced in the previous section, on a CSG G. Since rPATL is a branching-time logic,
this works by recursively computing the set Sat(φ) of states satisfying formula φ
over the structure of φ, as is done for rPATL on TSGs [23].
If φ is a zero-sum formula of the form 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] or 〈〈C〉〉R
r
∼x[ ρ ], this reduces
to computing values for a two-player CSG (either GC or GN\C) with respect to
Xψ or Xr,ρ. In particular, for ∼∈ {>, >} and s ∈ S we have:
s |= 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] ⇔ valGC (s,X
ψ) ∼ q
s |= 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ] ⇔ valGC (s,X
r,ρ) ∼ x .
and, since CSGs are determined for the zero-sum properties we consider, for ∼∈
{<,6} we have:
s |= 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] ⇔ valGN\C (s,X
ψ) ∼ q
s |= 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ] ⇔ valGN\C (s,X
r,ρ) ∼ x .
Without loss of generality, for such formulae we focus on computing valGC (s,X
ψ)
and valGC (s,X
r,ρ) and, to simplify the presentation, we denote these values by
VGC (s,ψ) and VGC (s, r, ρ) respectively.
If, on the other hand, φ is a nonzero-sum formula of the form 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ)
then, from the semantics for 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ) (see Definition 14), computing Sat(φ)
reduces to the computation of subgame-perfect SWNE or SCNE values for the
objectives (Xθ1 , X
θ
2 ) and a comparison of their sum to the threshold x. Again, to
simplify the presentation, will use the notation VGC (s, θ) for the SWNE values of
the objectives (Xθ1 , X
θ
2 ) in state s of G
C .
For the remainder of this section, we fix a CSG G = (N,S, S¯, A,∆, δ,AP ,L) and
coalition C of players and assume that the available actions of players 1 and 2 of
the (two-player) CSG GC in a state s are {a1, . . . , al} and {b1, . . . , bm}, respectively.
We also fix a value ε > 0 which, as discussed in Section 3, is needed to define the
semantics of our logic, in particular for infinite-horizon objectives where we need
to consider ε-SWNE profiles.
Assumptions. Our model checking algorithms require several assumptions on
CSGs, depending on the operators that appear in the formula φ. These can all
be checked using standard graph algorithms [2]. In the diverse set of model check-
ing case studies that we later present in Section 7.2, these assumptions have not
limited the practical applicability of our model checking algorithms.
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For zero-sum formulae, the only restriction is for infinite-horizon reward prop-
erties on CSGs with both positive and negative reward values.
Assumption 1 For a zero-sum formula of the form 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ F φ ], from any state
s where rS(s) < 0 or rA(s, a) < 0 for some action a, under all profiles of G, with
probability 1 we reach either a state satisfying φ or a state where all rewards are zero
and which cannot be left with probability 1 under all profiles.
Without this assumption, the values computed during value iteration can oscillate,
and therefore fail to converge (see Appendix A). This restriction is not applied
in the existing rPATL model checking algorithms for TSGs [23] since that work
assumes that all rewards are non-negative.
The remaining two assumptions concern nonzero-sum formulae that contain
infinite-horizon objectives. We restrict our attention to a class of CSGs that can
be seen as a variant of stopping games [24], as used for multi-objective TSGs.
Compared to [24], we use a weaker, objective-dependent assumption, which ensures
that, under all profiles, with probability 1, eventually the outcome of each player’s
objective does not change by continuing.
Assumption 2 For nonzero-sum formulae, if P[φ1 U φ2 ] is a probabilistic objective,
then Sat(¬φ1 ∨ φ2) is reached with probability 1 from all states under all profiles of G.
Assumption 3 For nonzero-sum formulae, if Rr[ F φ ] is a reward objective, then
Sat(φ) is reached with probability 1 from all states under all profiles of G.
Like for Assumption 1, without this restriction, value iteration may not converge
since values can oscillate (see Appendices B and C). Notice that Assumption 1
is not required for nonzero-sum properties containing negative rewards since As-
sumption 3 is itself a stronger restriction.
4.1 Model Checking Zero-Sum Properties
In this section, we present algorithms for zero-sum properties, i.e., for computing
the values VGC (s, ψ) or VGC (s, r, ρ) for path formulae ψ or reward formulae ρ in all
states s of GC . We split the presentation into finite-horizon properties, which can be
solved exactly using backward induction [72,60], and infinite-horizon properties, for
which we approximate values using value iteration [70,19]. Both cases require the
solution of matrix games, for which we rely on the linear programming approach
presented in Section 2.1.1.
4.1.1 Computing the Values of Zero-Sum Finite-Horizon Formulae
Finite-horizon properties are defined over a bounded number of steps: the next
or bounded until operators for probabilistic formulae, and the instantaneous or
bounded cumulative reward operators. Computation of the values VGC (s,ψ) or
VGC (s, r, ρ) for these is done recursively, based on the step bound, using backward
induction and solving matrix games in each state at each iteration. The actions
of each matrix game correspond to the actions available in that state; the utilities
are constructed from the transition probabilities δC of the game GC , the reward
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structure r (in the case of reward formulae) and the values already computed
recursively for successor states.
Next. This is the simplest operator, over just one step, and so in fact requires no
recursion, just solution of a matrix game for each state. If ψ = Xφ, then for any
state s we have that VGC (s, ψ) = val(Z) where Z ∈ Q
l×m is the matrix game with:
zi,j =
∑
s′∈Sat(φ) δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) .
Bounded Until. If ψ = φ1 U
6k φ2, we compute the values for the path formulae
ψn = φ1 U
6n φ2 for 0 6 n 6 k recursively. For any state s:
VGC (s,ψn) =


1 if s ∈ Sat(φ2)
0 else if s 6∈ Sat(φ1)
0 else if n = 0
val(Z) otherwise
where val(Z) equals the value of the matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m with:
zi,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′
n−1
and vs
′
n−1 = VGC (s
′, ψn−1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Instantaneous Rewards. If ρ = I=k, then for the reward structure r we compute
the values for the reward formulae ρn = I
=n for 0 6 n 6 k recursively. For any
state s:
VGC (s, r, ρn) =
{
rS(s) if n = 0
val(Z) otherwise
where val(Z) equals the value of the matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m with:
zi,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′
n−1
and vs
′
n−1 = VGC (s
′, r, ρn−1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Bounded Cumulative Rewards. If ρ = C6k, then for the reward structure r we
compute the values for the reward formulae ρn = C
6n for 0 6 n 6 k recursively.
For any state s:
VGC (s, r, ρn) =
{
0 if n = 0
val(Z) otherwise
where val(Z) equals the value of the matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m with:
zi,j = rA(s, (ai, bj)) + rS(s) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′
n−1
and vs
′
n−1 = VGC (s
′, r, ρn−1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
20 Marta Kwiatkowska et al.
4.1.2 Computing the Values of Zero-Sum Infinite Horizon Formulae
We now discuss how to compute the values VGC (s, ψ) and VGC (s, r, ρ) for infinite-
horizon properties, i.e., when the path formula ψ is an until operator, or for the
expected reachability variant of the reward formulae ρ. In both cases, we approxi-
mate these values using value iteration, adopting a similar recursive computation
to the finite-horizon cases above, solving matrix games in each state and at each
iteration, which converges in the limit to the desired values.
Following the approach typically taken in probabilistic model checking tools to
implement value iteration, we estimate convergence of the iterative computation by
checking the maximum relative difference between successive iterations. However,
it is known [36] that, even for simpler probabilistic models such as MDPs, this
convergence criterion cannot be used to guarantee that the final computed values
are accurate to within a specified error bound. Alternative approaches that resolve
this by computing lower and upper bounds for each state have been proposed for
MDPs (e.g. [36,13]) and extended to both single- and multi-objective solution of
TSGs [42,7]; extensions could be investigated for CSGs. Another possibility is to
use policy iteration (see, e.g., [18]).
Until. If ψ = φ1 U φ2, the probability values can be approximated through value
iteration using the fact that 〈VGC (s, φ1 U
6k φ2)〉k∈N is a non-decreasing sequence
converging to VGC (s, φ1 U φ2). We compute VGC (s, φ1 U
6k φ2) for increasingly large
k and estimate convergence as described above, based on the difference between
values in successive iterations. However, we can potentially speed up convergence
by first precomputing the set of states Sψ0 for which the value of the zero-sum
objective Xψ is 0 and the set of states Sψ1 for which the value is 1 using stan-
dard graph algorithms [2]. We can then apply value iteration to approximate
VGC (s, φ1 U φ2) = limk→∞ VGC (s, φ1 U φ2, k) where:
VGC (s, φ1 U φ2, n) =


1 if s ∈ Sψ1
0 else if s ∈ Sψ0
0 else if n = 0
val(Z) otherwise
where val(Z) equals the value of the matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m with:
zi,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′
n−1
and vs
′
n−1 = VGC (s
′, φ1 U φ2, n− 1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Expected Reachability. If ρ = F φ and the reward structure is r, then we first
make all states of GC satisfying φ absorbing, i.e., we remove all outgoing transitions
from such states. Second, we find the set of states Sρ∞ for which the reward is
infinite; as in [23], this involves finding the set of states satisfying the formula
〈〈C〉〉P<1[ F φ ] and we can use the graph algorithms of [2] to find these states. Again
following [23], to deal with zero-reward cycles we need to use value iteration to
compute a greatest fixed point. This involves first computing upper bounds on
the actual values, by changing all zero reward values to some value γ > 0 to
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construct the reward structure rγ = (r
γ
A, r
γ
A) and then applying value iteration to
approximate VGC (s, rγ , ρ) = limk→∞ VGC (s, rγ , ρk) where:
VGC (s, rγ , ρn) =


0 if s ∈ Sat(φ)
∞ if s ∈ Sρ∞
val(Z) otherwise
where val(Z) equals the value of the matrix game Z ∈ Ql×m with:
zi,j = r
γ
A(s, (ai, bj)) + r
γ
S(s) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′
n−1
and vs
′
n−1 = VGC (s
′, rγ , ρn−1) for all s
′ ∈ S. Finally, using these upper bounds as
the initial values we again perform value iteration as above, except now using the
original reward structure r, i.e., to approximate VGC (s, r,ρ) = limk→∞ VGC (s, r, ρk).
The choice of γ can influence value iteration computations in opposing ways: in-
creasing γ can speed up convergence when computing over-approximations, while
potentially slowing it down when computing the actual values.
4.2 Model Checking Nonzero-Sum Properties
Next, we show how to compute subgame-perfect SWNE and SCNE values for the
two objectives corresponding to a nonzero-sum formula. As for the zero-sum case,
the approach taken depends on whether the formula contains finite-horizon or
infinite-horizon objectives. We now have three cases:
1. when both objectives are finite-horizon, we use backward induction [72,60] to
compute (precise) subgame-perfect SWNE and SCNE values;
2. when both objectives are infinite-horizon, we use value iteration [70,19] to
approximate the values;
3. when there is a mix of the two types of objectives, we convert the problem to
two infinite-horizon objectives on an augmented model.
We describe these three cases separately in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, respec-
tively, focusing on the computation of SWNE values. Then, in Section 4.2.4, we
explain how to adapt this for SCNE values.
In a similar style to the algorithms for zero-sum properties, in all three cases
the computation is an iterative process that analyses a two-player game for each
state at each step. However, this now requires finding SWNE or SCNE values of
a bimatrix game, rather than solving a matrix game as in the zero-sum case. We
solve bimatrix games using the approach presented in Section 2.1.2 (see also the
more detailed discussion of its implementation in Section 6.2).
Another important aspect of our algorithms is that, for efficiency, if we reach
a state where the value of one player’s objective cannot change (e.g., the goal of
that player is reached or can no longer be reached), then we switch to the simpler
problem of solving an MDP to find the optimal value for the other player in that
state. This is possible since the only SWNE profile in that state corresponds to
maximising the objective of the other player. More precisely:
– the first player (whose objective cannot change) is indifferent, since its value
will not be affected by the choices of either player;
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– the second player cannot do better than the optimal value of its objective in
the corresponding MDP where both players collaborate;
– for any NE profile, the value of the first player is fixed and the value of the
second is less than or equal to the optimal value of its objective in the MDP.
We use the notation PmaxG,s (ψ) and R
max
G,s (r, ρ) for the maximum probability of satisfy-
ing the path formula ψ and the maximum expected reward for the random variable
rew(r, ρ), respectively, when the players collaborate in state s. These values can be
computed through standard MDP model checking [10,1].
4.2.1 Computing SWNE Values of Finite-Horizon Nonzero-Sum Formulae
As for the zero-sum case, for a finite-horizon nonzero-sum formula θ, we compute
the SWNE values VGC (s, θ) for all states s of G
C in a recursive fashion based on
the step bound. We now solve bimatrix games at each step, which are defined
in a similar manner to the matrix games for zero-sum properties: the actions
of each bimatrix game correspond to the actions available in that state and the
utilities are constructed from the transition probabilities δC of the game GC , the
reward structure (in the case of reward formulae) and the values already computed
recursively for successor states.
For any state formula φ and state s we let ηφ(s) equal 1 if s ∈ Sat(φ) and
0 otherwise. Recall that probability and reward values of the form PmaxG,s (ψ) and
R
max
G,s (r, ρ), respectively, are computed through standard MDP verification. Below,
we explain the computation for both types of finite-horizon probabilistic objec-
tives (next and bounded until) and reward objectives (instantaneous and bounded
cumulative), as well as combinations of each type.
Next. If θ = P[ Xφ1 ]+P[ Xφ2 ], then VGC (s, θ) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix
game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m where:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈Sat(φ1) δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′)
z2i,j =
∑
s′∈Sat(φ2) δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) .
Again, since next is a 1-step property, no recursion is required.
Bounded Until. If θ = P[φ11 U
6k1 φ12 ] + P[φ
2
1 U
6k2 φ22 ], we compute SWNE values
for the objectives for the nonzero-sum formulae θn+n1,n+n2 = P[φ
1
1 U
6n+n1 φ12 ] +
P[φ21 U
6n+n2 φ22 ] for 0 6 n 6 k recursively, where k = min{k1, k2}, n1 = k1−k
and n2 = k2−k. In this case, there are three situations in which the value of
the objective of one of the players cannot change, and hence we can switch to
MDP verification. The first is when the step bound is zero for only one of the
corresponding objectives, the second is when a state satisfying φi2 is reached by
only one player i (and therefore the objective is satisfied by that state) and the
third is when a state satisfying ¬φi1 ∧ ¬φ
i
2 is reached by only one player i (and
therefore the objective is not satisfied by that state). For any state s, if n = 0,
then:
VGC (s, θn1,n2) =


(ηφ12(s), ηφ22(s)) if n1 = n2 = 0
(ηφ12(s),P
max
G,s (φ
2
1 U
6n2 φ22)) else if n1 = 0
(PmaxG,s (φ
1
1 U
6n1 φ12), ηφ22(s)) otherwise.
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On the other hand, if n > 0, then:
VGC (s, θn+n1,n+n2) =


(1,1) if s ∈ Sat(φ12) ∩ Sat(φ
2
2)
(1,PmaxG,s (φ
2
1 U
6n+n2 φ22)) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
1
2)
(PmaxG,s (φ
1
1 U
6n+n1 φ12), 1) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
2
2)
(PmaxG,s (φ
1
1 U
6n+n1 φ12), 0) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
1
1) \ Sat(φ
2
1)
(0,PmaxG,s (φ
2
1 U
6n+n2 φ22)) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
2
1) \ Sat(φ
1
1)
(0,0) else if s 6∈ Sat(φ11) ∩ Sat(φ
2
1)
val(Z1,Z2) otherwise
where val(Z1,Z2) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
z2i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
and (vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
, vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
) = VGC (s
′, θ(n−1)+n1,(n−1)+n2) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Next and Bounded Until. If θ = P[ Xφ1 ]+P[φ21 U
6k2 φ22 ], then VGC (s, θ) equals
SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m where:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · ηφ1(s
′)
z2i,j =


1 if s ∈ Sat(φ22)
0 else if k2 = 0∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · PmaxG,s (φ
2
1 U
6k2−1 φ22) else if Sat(φ
2
1)
0 otherwise.
In this case, since the value for objectives corresponding to next formulae cannot
change after the first step, we can always switch to MDP verification after this
step. The symmetric case is similar.
Instantaneous Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ I=k1 ]+Rr2 [ I=k2 ], we compute SWNE val-
ues of the objectives for the nonzero-sum formulae θn+n1,n+n2 = R
r1 [ I=n+n1 ] +
R
r2 [ I=n+n2 ] for 0 6 n 6 k recursively, where k = min{k1, k2}, n1 = k1−k and
n2 = k2−k. Here, there is only one situation in which the value of the objective of
one of the players cannot change: when one of the step bounds equals zero. Hence,
this is the only time we switch to MDP verification. For any state s, if n = 0, then:
VGC (s, θn1,n2) =


(r1S(s), r
2
S(s)) if n1 = n2 = 0
(r1S(s),R
max
G,s (r2, I
=n2)) else if n1 = 0
(RmaxG,s (r1, I
=n1), r2S(s)) otherwise.
On the other hand, if n > 0, then VGC (s, θn+n1,n+n2) equals SWNE values of the
bimatrix game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m where:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
z2i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
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and (vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
, vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
) = VGC (s
′, θ(n−1)+n1,(n−1)+n2) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Bounded Cumulative Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ C6k1 ]+Rr2 [ C6k2 ], we compute values
of the objectives for the formulae θn+n1,n+n2 = R
r1 [ C6n+n1 ] + Rr2 [ C6n+n2 ] for
0 6 n 6 k recursively, where k = min{k1, k2}, n1 = k1−k and n2 = k2−k. As for
instantaneous rewards, the only time we can switch to MDP verification is when
one of the step bounds equals zero. For state s, if n = 0:
VGC (s, θn1,n2) =


(0, 0) if n1 = n2 = 0
(0, RmaxG,s (r2, C
6n2)) else if n1 = 0
(RmaxG,s (r1, C
6n1),0) otherwise
and if n > 0, then VGC (s, θn+n1,n+n2) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix game
(Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m:
z1i,j = r
1
S(s) + r
1
A(s, (ai, bj)) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
z2i,j = r
2
S(s) + r
2
A(s, (ai, bj)) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,l
(n−1)+n2
and (vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
, vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
) = VGC (s
′, θ(n−1)+n1,(n−1)+n2) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Bounded Instantaneous and Cumulative Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ I6k1 ]+Rr2 [ C6k2 ],
we compute values of the objectives for the formulae θn+n1,n+n2 = R
r1 [ I6n+n1 ] +
R
r2 [ C6n+n2 ] for 0 6 n 6 k recursively, where k = min{k1, k2}, n1 = k1−k and
n2 = k2−k. Again, here we can only switch to MDP verification when one of the
step bounds equals zero. For state s, if n = 0:
VGC (s, θn1,n2) =


(r1S(s),0) if n1 = n2 = 0
(r1S(s),R
max
G,s (r2, C
6n2)) else if n1 = 0
(RmaxG,s (r1, I
6n1), 0) otherwise
and if n > 0, then VGC (s, θn+n1,n+n2) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix game
(Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
z2i,j = r
2
S(s) + r
2
A(s, (ai, bj)) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,l
(n−1)+n2
and (vs
′,1
(n−1)+n1
, vs
′,2
(n−1)+n2
) = VGC (s
′, θ(n−1)+n1,(n−1)+n2) for all s
′ ∈ S. The sym-
metric case follows similarly.
4.2.2 Computing SWNE Values of Infinite-Horizon Nonzero-Sum Formulae
We next show how to compute SWNE values VGC (s, θ) for infinite-horizon nonzero-
sum formulae θ in all states s of GC . As for the zero-sum case, we approximate
these using a value iteration approach. Each step of this computation is similar in
nature to the algorithms in the previous section, where a bimatrix game is solved
for each state, and a reduction to solving an MDP is used after one of the player’s
objective can no longer change.
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A key aspect of the value iteration algorithm is that, while the SWNE (or
SCNE) values take the form of a pair, with one value for each player, convergence
is defined over the sum of the two values. This is because there is not necessarily
a unique pair of such values, but the maximum (or minimum) of the sum of NE
values is uniquely defined. Convergence of value iteration is estimated in the same
way as for the zero-sum computation (see Section 4.1.2), by comparing values in
successive iterations. As previously, this means that we are not able to guarantee
that the computed values are within a particular error bound of the exact values.
Below, we give the algorithms for the cases of two infinite-horizon objectives.
The notation used is as in the previous section: for any state formula φ and state s
we let ηφ(s) equal 1 if s ∈ Sat(φ) and 0 otherwise; and values of the form P
max
G,s (ψ)
and RmaxG,s (r, ρ) are computed through standard MDP verification.
Until. If θ = P[φ11 U φ
1
2 ]+P[φ
2
1 U φ
2
2 ], values for any state s can be computed
through value iteration as the limit VGC (s, θ) = limn→∞ VGC (s, θ, n) where:
VGC (s, θ, n) =


(1,1) if s ∈ Sat(φ12) ∩ Sat(φ
2
2)
(1,PmaxG,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2)) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
1
2)
(PmaxG,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2), 1) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
2
2)
(PmaxG,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2), 0) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
1
1) \ Sat(φ
2
1)
(0,PmaxG,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2)) else if s ∈ Sat(φ
2
1) \ Sat(φ
1
1)
(0,0) else if n = 0 or s 6∈ Sat(φ11) ∩ Sat(φ
2
1)
val(Z1,Z2) otherwise
where val(Z1,Z2) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m:
z1i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
n−1
z2i,j =
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,2
n−1
and (vs
′,1
n−1, v
s′,2
n−1) = VGC (s
′, θ, n−1) for all s′ ∈ S.
As can be seen, there are two situations in which we switch to MDP verification.
These correspond to the two cases where the value of the objective of one of the
players cannot change: when a state satisfying φi2 is reached for only one player i
(and therefore the objective is satisfied by that state) and when a state satisfying
¬φi1 ∧ ¬φ
i
2 is reached for only one player i (and therefore the objective is not
satisfied by that state).
Expected Reachability. If θ = Rr1 [ F φ1 ]+Rr2 [ F φ2 ], values can be computed
through value iteration as the limit VGC (s, θ) = limn→∞ VGC (s, θ, n) where:
VGC (s, θ, n) =


(0,0) if s ∈ Sat(φ1) ∩ Sat(φ2)
(0,0) else if n = 0
(0,RmaxG,s (r2, F φ
2)) else if s ∈ Sat(φ1)
(RmaxG,s (r1, F φ
1),0) else if s ∈ Sat(φ2)
val(Z1,Z2) otherwise
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where val(Z1,Z2) equals SWNE values of the bimatrix game (Z1,Z2) ∈ Q
l×m:
z1i,j = r
1
S(s) + r
1
A(s, (ai, bj)) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,1
n−1
z2i,j = r
2
S(s) + r
2
A(s, (ai, bj)) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, (ai, bj))(s
′) · vs
′,2
n−1
and (vs
′,1
n−1, v
s′,2
n−1) = VGC (s
′, θ, n−1) for all s′ ∈ S.
In this case, the only situation in which the value of the objective of one of
the players cannot change is when only one of their goals is reached, i.e., when a
state satisfying φi is reached for only one player i. This is therefore the only time
we switch to MDP verification.
4.2.3 Computing SWNE Values of Mixed Nonzero-Sum Formulae
We now present the algorithms for computing SWNE values of nonzero-sum for-
mula containing a mixture of both finite- and infinite-horizon objectives. This is
achieved by finding values for a sum of two modified (infinite-horizon) objectives
θ′ on a modified game G′ using the algorithms presented in Section 4.2.2. This
approach is based on the standard construction for converting the verification of
finite-horizon properties to infinite-horizon properties [68]. We consider the cases
when the first objective is finite-horizon and second infinite-horizon; the symmet-
ric cases follow similarly. In each case, the modified game has states of the form
(s, n), where s is a state of GC , n ∈ N and the SWNE values VGC (s, θ) are given by
the SWNE values VG′((s,0), θ
′).
Next and Unbounded Until. If θ = P[ Xφ1 ]+P[φ21 U φ
2
2 ], then we construct the
game G′ = ({1,2}, S′, S¯′, AC ,∆′, δ′, {aφ1 , aφ21 , aφ22},L
′) where:
– S′ = {(s, n) | s ∈ S ∧ 0 6 n 6 2} and S¯′ = {(s, 0) | s ∈ S};
– ∆′((s, n)) = ∆C(s) for all (s, n) ∈ S′;
– for any (s, n), (s′, n′) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
δ′((s, n), a)((s′, n′)) =


δC(s, a)(s′) if 0 6 n 6 1 and n′ = n+1
δC(s, a)(s′) else if n = n′ = 2
0 otherwise;
– for any (s, n) ∈ S′ and 1 6 j 6 2:
– aφ1 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ1) and n = 1;
– aφ2
j
∈ L′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ2j ).
and compute the SWNE values of θ′ = P[ true U aφ1 ]+P[ aφ21 U aφ22 ] for G
′.
Bounded and Unbounded Until. If θ = P[φ11 U
6k1 φ12 ] + P[φ
2
1 U φ
2
2 ], then we
construct the game G′ = ({1, 2}, S′, S¯′, AC ,∆′, δ′, {aφ11 , aφ12 , aφ21 , aφ22},L
′) where:
– S′ = {(s, n) | s ∈ S ∧ 0 6 n 6 k1+1} and S¯
′ = {(s, 0) | s ∈ S};
– ∆′((s, n)) = ∆C(s) for all (s, n) ∈ S′;
– for any (s, n), (s′, n′) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
δ′((s, n), a)((s′, n′)) =


δC(s, a)(s′) if 0 6 n 6 k1 and n
′ = n+1
δC(s, a)(s′) else if n = n′ = k1+1
0 otherwise;
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– for any (s, n) ∈ S′ and 1 6 j 6 2:
– aφ11 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ11) and 0 6 n 6 k1;
– aφ12 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ12) and 0 6 n 6 k1;
– aφ2
j
∈ L′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ2j ).
and compute the SWNE values of θ′ = P[ aφ11 U aφ12 ]+P[ aφ21 U aφ22 ] for G
′.
Bounded Instantaneous and Expected Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ I=k1 ] + Rr2 [ F φ2 ],
then we construct the game G′ = ({1, 2}, S′, S¯′, AC ,∆′, δ′, {ak1+1, aφ2},L
′) and re-
ward structures r′1 and r
′
2 where:
– S′ = {(s, n) | s ∈ S ∧ 0 6 n 6 k1+1} and S¯
′ = {(s, 0) | s ∈ S};
– ∆′((s, n)) = ∆C(s) for all (s, n) ∈ S′;
– for any (s, n), (s′, n′) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
δ′((s, n), a)((s′, n′)) =


δC(s, a)(s′) if 0 6 n 6 k1 and n
′ = n+1
δC(s, a)(s′) else if n = n′ = k1+1
0 otherwise;
– for any (s, n) ∈ S′:
– ak1+1 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if n = k1+1;
– aφ2 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ2);
– for any (s, n) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
– r1
′
A ((s, n), a) = 0 and r
1′
S ((s, n)) = r
1C
S (s) if n = k1 and r
1′
A ((s, n), a) = 0 and
r1
′
S ((s, n)) = 0 otherwise;
– r2
′
A ((s, n), a) = r
2C
A (s)(a) and r
2′
S ((s, n)) = r
2C
S (s).
and compute the SWNE values of θ′ = Rr
′
1 [ F ak1+1 ]+R
r′2 [ F aφ2 ] for G
′.
Bounded Cumulative and Expected Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ C6k1 ] + Rr2 [ F φ2 ],
then we construct the game G′ = ({1,2}, S′, S¯′, AC ,∆′, δ′, {ak1 , aφ2},L
′) and reward
structures r′1 and r
′
2 where:
– S′ = {(s, n) | s ∈ S ∧ 0 6 i 6 k1} and S¯
′ = {(s, 0) | s ∈ S};
– ∆′((s, n)) = ∆C(s) for all (s, n) ∈ S′;
– for any (s, n), (s′, n′) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
δ′((s,n), a)((s′, n′)) =


δC(s, a)(s′) if 0 6 n 6 k1−1 and n
′ = n+1
δC(s, a)(s′) else if n = n′ = k1
0 otherwise;
– for any (s, n) ∈ S′:
– ak1 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if n = k1;
– aφ2 ∈ L
′((s, n)) if and only if s ∈ Sat(φ2);
– for any (s, n) ∈ S′ and a ∈ AC :
– r1
′
A ((s, n))(a) = r
1C
A (s) if 0 6 n 6 k1−1 and equals 0 otherwise;
– r1
′
S ((s, n)) = r
1C
S (s) if 0 6 n 6 k1−1 and equals 0 otherwise;
– r2
′
A ((s, n), a) = r
2C
A (s)(a) and r
2′
S ((s, n)) = r
2C
S (s).
and compute the SWNE values of θ′ = Rr
′
1 [ F ak1 ]+R
r′2 [ F aφ2 ] for G
′.
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4.2.4 Computing SCNE Values of Nonzero-Sum Formulae
The case for SCNE values follows similarly to the SWNE case using backward
induction for finite-horizon properties and value iteration for infinite-horizon prop-
erties. There are two differences in the computation. First, when solving MDPs,
we find the minimum probability of satisfying path formulae and the minimum
expected reward for reward formulae. Second, when solving the bimatrix games
constructed during backward induction and value iteration, we find SCNE rather
than SWNE values; this is achieved through Lemma 1. More precisely, we negate
all the utilities in the game, find the SWNE values of this modified game, then
negate these values to obtain SCNE values of the original bimatrix game.
4.3 Strategy Synthesis
In addition to verifying formulae in our extension of rPATL, it is typically also very
useful to perform strategy synthesis, i.e., to construct a witness to the satisfaction
of a property. For each zero-sum formula 〈〈C〉〉P∼q[ψ ] or 〈〈C〉〉Rr∼x[ ρ ] appearing
as a sub-formula, this comprises optimal strategies for the players in coalition C
(or, equivalently, for player 1 in the coalition game GC) for the objective Xψ or
Xr,ρ. For each nonzero-sum formula 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ) appearing as a sub-formula,
this is a subgame-perfect SWNE/SCNE profile for the objectives (Xθ1 , X
θ
2 ) in the
coalition game GC .
We can perform strategy synthesis by adapting the model checking algorithms
described in the previous sections which computes the values of zero-sum objectives
and SWNE or SCNE values of nonzero-sum objectives. The type of strategy needed
(deterministic or randomised; memoryless or finite-memory) depends on the types
of objectives. As discussed previously (in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.1.2), for infinite-
horizon objectives our use of value iteration means we cannot guarantee that the
values computed are within a particular error bound of the actual values; so, the
same will be true of the optimal strategy that we synthesise for such a formula.
Zero-sum properties. For zero-sum formulae, all strategies synthesised are ran-
domised; this is in contrast to checking the equivalent properties against TSGs [23],
where deterministic strategies are sufficient. For infinite-horizon objectives, we syn-
thesise memoryless strategies, i.e., a distribution over actions for each state of the
game. For finite-horizon objectives, strategies are finite-memory, with a separate
distribution required for each state and each time step.
For both types of objectives, we synthesise the strategies whilst computing
values using the approach presented in Section 4.1: from the matrix game solved
for each state, we extract not just the value of the game, but also an optimal
(randomised) strategy for player 1 of GC in that state. It is also possible to extract
the optimal strategy for player 2 in the state by solving the dual LP problem for
the matrix game (see Section 2.1.1). For finite-horizon objectives, we retain the
choices for all steps; for infinite-horizon objectives, just those from the final step
of value iteration are needed.
Nonzero-sum properties. In the case of a nonzero-sum formula, randomisation
is again needed for all types of objectives. Similarly to zero-sum formulae above,
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strategies are generated whilst computing SWNE or SCNE values, using the algo-
rithms presented in Section 4.2. Now, we do this in two distinct ways:
– when solving bimatrix games in each state, we also extract an SWNE/SCNE
profile, comprising the distributions over actions for each player of GC in that
state;
– when solving MDPs, we also synthesise an optimal strategy for the MDP [49],
which is equivalent to a strategy profile for GC (in fact, randomisation is not
needed for this part).
The final synthesised profile is then constructed by initially following the ones
generated when solving bimatrix games, and then switching to the MDP strategies
if we reach a state where the value of one player’s objective cannot change. This
means that all strategies synthesised for nonzero-sum formulae may need memory.
As for the zero-sum case, finite-horizon strategies are finite-memory since separate
player choices are stored for each state and each time step. But, in addition, for
both finite- and infinite-horizon objectives, one bit of memory is required to record
that a switch is made to the strategy extracted when solving the MDP.
4.4 Complexity
Due to its overall recursive nature, the complexity of our model checking algo-
rithms are linear in the size of the formula φ. In terms of the problems solved
for each subformula, finding zero-sum values of a 2-player CSG is PSPACE [20]
and finding subgame-perfect NE for reachability objectives of a 2-player CSG is
PSPACE-complete [15]. In practice, our algorithms are iterative, so the complexity
depends on the number of iterations required, the number of states in the CSG
and the problems solved for each state and in each step.
For finite-horizon objectives, the number of iterations is equal to the step-
bound in the formula. For infinite-horizon objectives, the number of iterations
depends on the convergence criterion used. For zero-sum properties, an exponential
lower bound has been shown for the worst-case number of iterations required for a
non-trivial approximation [37]. We report on efficiency in practice in Section 7.1.
In the case of zero-sum properties, for each state, at each iteration, we need to
solve an LP problem of size |A|. Such problems can be solved using the simplex
algorithm, which is PSPACE-complete [29], but performs well on average [75].
Alternatively, Karmarkar’s algorithm [41] could be used, which is PTIME.
For nonzero-sum properties, in each state, at each iteration, we need to find all
solutions to an LCP problem of size |A|. Papadimitriou established the complexity
of solving the class of LCPs we encounter to be in PPAD (polynomial parity argu-
ment in a directed graph) [65] and, to the best of our knowledge, there is still no
polynomial algorithm for solving such problems. More closely related to finding
all solutions, it has been shown that determining if there exists an equilibrium
in a bimatrix game for which each player obtains a utility of a given bound is
NP-complete [32]. Also, it is demonstrated in [8] that bimatrix games may have a
number of NE that is exponential with respect to the size of the game, and thus
any method that relies on finding all NE in the worst case cannot be expected to
perform in a running time that is polynomial with respect to the size of the game.
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5 Correctness of the Model Checking Algorithms
The overall (recursive) approach and the reduction to solution of a two-player
game is essentially the same as for TSGs [23], and therefore the same correctness
arguments apply. In the case of zero-sum formulae, the correctness of value iteration
for infinite-horizon properties follows from [70] and for finite-horizon properties
from Definition 14 and the solution of matrix games (see Section 2). Below, we
show the correctness of the model checking algorithms for nonzero-sum formulae.
5.1 Nonzero-Sum Formulae
We fix a game G and a nonzero-sum formula 〈〈C:C′〉〉opt∼x(θ). For the case of finite-
horizon nonzero-sum formulae, the correctness of the model checking algorithms
follows from the fact that we use backward induction [72,60]. For infinite-horizon
nonzero-sum formulae, the proof is based on showing that the values computed
during value iteration correspond to subgame-perfect SWNE values of finite game
trees, and the values of these game trees converge uniformly and are bounded from
above by the actual values of GC .
The fact that we use MDP model checking when the goal of one of the players
is reached means that the values computed during value iteration are not finite
approximations for the values of GC . Therefore we must also show that the values
computed during value iteration are bounded from below by finite approximations
for the values of GC . We first consider the case when both the objectives in the sum
θ are infinite-horizon objectives. Below we assume opt = max and the case when
opt = min follow similarly. For any (v1, v2), (v
′
1, v
′
2) ∈ Q
2, let (v1, v2) 6 (v
′
1, v
′
2)
if and only if v1 6 v
′
1 and v2 6 v
′
2. The following lemma follows by definition of
subgame-perfect SWNE values.
Lemma 2 Consider any strategy profile σ and state s of GC and let (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) be
the corresponding values of the players in s for the objectives (Xθ1 , Xθ2). Considering
subgame-perfect SWNE values of the objectives (Xθ1 , Xθ2) in state s, in the case that
θ is of the form P[φ11 U φ
1
2 ]+P[φ
2
1 U φ
2
2 ] :
– if s |=φ12 ∧ φ
2
2, then (1,1) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE values for state s
and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (1,1);
– if s |= φ12∧φ
2
1∧¬φ
2
2, then (1,P
max
G,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2)) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE
values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (1, P
max
G,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2));
– if s |= φ11∧¬φ
1
2∧φ
2
2, then (P
max
G,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2), 1) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE
values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (P
max
G,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2),1);
– if s |=φ12 ∧¬φ
2
1 ∧¬φ
2
2, then (1,0) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE values for
state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (1,0);
– if s |=¬φ11 ∧¬φ
1
2 ∧φ
2
2, then (0,1) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE values for
state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (0,1);
– if s |=¬φ11∧¬φ
1
2∧φ
2
1∧¬φ
2
2, then (0, P
max
G,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2)) are the unique subgame-perfect
SWNE values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (0,P
max
G,s (φ
2
1 U φ
2
2));
– if s |=φ11∧¬φ
1
2∧¬φ
2
1∧¬φ
2
2, then (P
max
G,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2),0) are the unique subgame-perfect
SWNE values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (P
max
G,s (φ
1
1 U φ
1
2),0);
Automatic Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Systems 31
– if s |=¬φ11 ∧ ¬φ
1
2 ∧ ¬φ
2
1 ∧ ¬φ
2
2, then (0, 0) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE
values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (0, 0).
On the other hand, in the case that θ is of the form Rr1 [ F φ1 ]+Rr2 [ F φ2 ] :
– if s |=φ1 ∧ φ2, then (0,0) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE values for state s
and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (0,0);
– if s |=φ1 ∧ ¬φ2, then (0,RmaxG,s (r2, F φ
2)) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE
values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (0, R
max
G,s (r2, F φ
2));
– if s |=¬φ1 ∧ φ2, then (RmaxG,s (r1, F φ
1), 0) are the unique subgame-perfect SWNE
values for state s and (vσ,s1 , v
σ,s
2 ) 6 (R
max
G,s (r1, F φ
1), 0).
Next we require the following objectives of GC .
Definition 15 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ, 1 6 i 6 2
and n ∈ N, let Xθi,n be the objective where for any path pi of G
C :
X
P[φ11 U φ
1
2 ]+P[φ
2
1 U φ
2
2 ]
i,n (pi) =
{
1 if ∃k 6 n. (pi(k) |=φi2 ∧ ∀j < k. pi(j) |=φ
i
1)
0 otherwise
X
R
r1 [ F φ1 ]+Rr2 [ F φ2 ]
i,n (pi) =


∞ if ∀k ∈ N. pi(k) 6|=φi∑kφi−1
k=0
(
rA(pi(k), pi[k]) + rS(pi(k))
)
if kφi 6 n−1
0 otherwise
and kφi = min{k | k ∈ N ∧ pi(k) |=φ
i}.
The following lemma demonstrates that, for a fixed strategy profile and state, the
values of these objectives are non-decreasing and converge uniformly to the values
of θ.
Lemma 3 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ and ε > 0, there
exists N ∈ N such that, for any n > N , s ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ1GC×Σ
2
GC and 1 6 i 6 2 :
0 6 EσGC ,s(X
θ
i )− E
σ
GC ,s(X
θ
i,n) 6 ε .
Proof Consider any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ, state s and
1 6 i 6 2. Using Assumption 3 we have that, for subformulae Rr[ F φi ], the set
Sat(φi) is reached with probability 1 from all states of G under all profiles, and
therefore EσGC,s(X
θ
i ) is finite. Furthermore, for any n > N , by Definitions 14 and 15
we have that EσGC,s(X
θ
i,n) is the value of state s for the nth iteration of value itera-
tion [19] when computing EσGC,s(X
θ
i ) in the DTMC obtained from G
C by following
the strategy σ, and the sequence is both non-decreasing and converges. The fact
that we can choose an N independent of the strategy profile for uniform conver-
gence follows from Assumptions 2 and 3. ⊓⊔
In the proof of correctness we will use the fact that n iterations of value iteration
is equivalent to performing backward induction on the following game trees.
Definition 16 For any state s and n ∈ N, let GCn,s be the game tree corresponding
to playing GC for n steps when starting from state s and then terminating.
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We can map any strategy profile σ of GC to a strategy profile of GCn,s by only
considering the choices of the profile over the first n steps when starting from
state s. This mapping is clearly surjective, i.e., we can generate all profiles of GCn,s,
but is not injective. We also need the following objectives corresponding to the
values computed during value iteration for the game trees of Definition 16.
Definition 17 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ, s ∈ S,
n ∈ N, 1 6 i 6 2 and j = i+1 mod 2, let Y θi be the objective where, for any path
pi of GCn,s :
Y
P[φ11 U φ
1
2 ]+P[φ
2
1 U φ
2
2 ]
i (pi) =

1 if ∃m 6 n. (pi(m) |=φi ∧ ∀k < m. pi(k) |=φ11∧¬φ
1
2∧φ
2
1∧¬φ
2
2)
P
max
G,π(m)(φ
i
1 U φ
i
2) else if ∃m 6 n. (pi(m) |=φ
j ∧ ∀k < m. pi(k) |=φ11∧¬φ
1
2∧φ
2
1∧¬φ
2
2)
0 otherwise
Y
R
r1 [ F φ1 ]+Rr2 [ F φ2 ]
i (pi) ={
∞ if ∀k 6 n. pi(k) 6|=φi∑kφ1∨φ2−1
k=0
(
rA(pi(k), pi[k]) + rS(pi(k))
)
+ riS(pi(k)) otherwise
where
riS(s
′) =
{
R
max
G,s′ (ri, F φ
i) if s |=¬φi ∧ φj
0 otherwise
for s′ ∈ S and kφ1∨φ2 = min{k | k 6 n ∧ pi(k) |=φ
1 ∨ φ2}.
Similarly to Lemma 3, the lemma below demonstrates, for a fixed strategy profile
and state s of GC , that the values for the objectives given in Definition 17 when
played on the game trees GCn,s are non-decreasing and converge uniformly. As with
Lemma 3 the result follows from Assumptions 2 and 3.
Lemma 4 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ and ε > 0, there
exists N ∈ N such that for any m > n > N , σ ∈ Σ1GC×Σ
2
GC , s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2 :
0 6 EσGCm,s(Y
θ
i )− E
σ
GCn,s
(Y θi ) 6 ε .
We require the following lemma relating the values of the objectives Xθi,n, Y
θ
i and
Xθi for 1 6 i 6 2.
Lemma 5 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ, state s of GC ,
strategy profile σ such that when one of the targets of the objectives of θ is reached,
the profile then collaborates to maximise the value of the other objective, n ∈ N and
1 6 i 6 2 :
sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σ−i[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi,n) 6 sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σ−i[σi ]
GCn,s
(Y θi ) 6 supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σ−i[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi ) .
Proof Consider any strategy profile σ, n ∈ N and 1 6 i 6 2. By Definitions 15
and 17 it follows that:
E
σ
GC ,s(X
θ
i,n) 6 E
σ
GCn,s
(Y θi ).
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Furthermore, if we restrict the profile σ such that, when one of the targets of the
objectives of θ is reached, the profile then collaborates to maximise the value of
the other objective, then by Definitions 17 and 14:
E
σ
GCn,s
(Y θi ) 6 E
σ
GC ,s(X
θ
i ).
Combining these results with Lemma 2, we have:
sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σ−i[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi,n) 6 sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σ−i[σi]
GCn,s
(Y θi ) 6 supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σ−i[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )
as required. ⊓⊔
We now define the strategy profiles synthesised during value iteration.
Definition 18 For any n ∈ N and s ∈ S, let σn,s be the strategy profile generated
for the game tree GCn,s (when considering value iteration as backward induction)
and σn,⋆ be the synthesised strategy profile for GC after n iterations.
Before giving the proof of correctness we require the following results.
Lemma 6 For any state s of GC , sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ and
n ∈ N we have that σn,s is a subgame-perfect SWNE profile of the CSG GCn,s for the
objectives (Y θ1 , Y θ2).
Proof The result follows from the fact that value iteration selects SWNE profiles,
value iteration corresponds to performing backward induction for the objectives
(Y θ1 , Y θ2) and backward induction returns a subgame-perfect NE [72,60]. ⊓⊔
The following proposition demonstrates that value iteration converges and depends
on Assumptions 2 and 3. Without this assumption convergence cannot be guar-
anteed as demonstrated by the counterexamples in Appendix B and Appendix C.
Although value iteration converges, unlike value iteration for MDPs or zero-sum
games, the generated sequence of values is not necessarily non-decreasing.
Proposition 1 For any sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ and state s,
the sequence 〈VGC (s, θ, n)〉n∈N converges.
Proof For any state s and n ∈ N we can consider GCn,s as two-player infinite-action
NFGs Nn,s where for 1 6 i 6 2:
– the set of actions of player i equals the set of strategies of player i in GC ;
– for the action pair (σ1, σ2), the utility function for player i returns E
σ
GCn,s
(Y θi ).
The correctness of this construction relies on the mapping of strategy profiles
from the game GC to GCn,s being surjective. Using Lemma 4, we have that the se-
quence 〈Nn,s〉n∈N of NFGs converges uniformly, and therefore, since VGC (s, θ, n) are
subgame-perfect SWNE values of GCn,s (see Lemma 6), the sequence 〈VGC (s, θ, n)〉n∈N
also converges. ⊓⊔
A similar convergence result to Proposition 1 has been shown for the simpler case
of discounted properties in [30].
Lemma 7 For any ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for any s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2:∣∣Eσn,⋆GC ,s(Xθi )− Eσn,sGCn,s(Y θi ) ∣∣ 6 ε .
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Proof Using Lemma 4 and Proposition 1, we can choose N such that the choices
of the profile σn,s agree with those of σn,⋆ for a sufficient number of steps such
that the inequality holds. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 For a given sum of two probabilistic or reward objectives θ and ε > 0,
there exists N ∈ N such that for any n > N the strategy profile σn,⋆ is a subgame-perfect
ε-SWNE profile of GC and the objectives (Xθ1 , Xθ2).
Proof Consider any ε > 0. From Lemma 7 there exists N1 ∈ N such that for any
s ∈ S and n > N1: ∣∣Eσn,⋆GC ,s(Xθi )− Eσn,sGCn,s(Y θi ) ∣∣ 6 ε2 . (5)
For any m ∈ N and s ∈ S, using Lemma 6 we have that σm,s is a NE of GCm,s, and
therefore for any m ∈ N, s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2:
E
σm,s
GCm,s
(Y θi ) > sup
σi∈Σ
GC
m,s
i
E
σm,s−i [σi]
GCm,s
(Y θi ) . (6)
From Lemma 3 there exists N2 ∈ N such that for any n > N2, s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2:
supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σn,⋆−i [σi ]
GC ,s
(Xθi )− supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σn,⋆−i [σi ]
GC ,s
(Xθi,n) 6
ε
2 . (7)
By construction, σn,⋆ is a profile for which, if one of the targets of the objectives
of θ is reached, the profile maximises the value of the objective. We can thus
rearrange (7) and apply Lemma 5 to yield for any n > N2, s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2:
sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σn,s−i [σi]
GCn,s
(Y θi ) > supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σn,⋆−i [σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )−
ε
2 . (8)
Letting N = max{N1, N2}, for any n > N , s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2:
E
σn,⋆
GC ,s(X
θ
i ) > E
σn,s
GCn,s
(Y θi )−
ε
2 by (5) since n > N1
> sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σn,s−i [σi]
GCn,s
(Y θi )−
ε
2 by (6)
>
(
supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σn,⋆−i [σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )−
ε
2
)
− ε2 by (8) since n > N2
= supσi∈ΣG
C
i
E
σn,⋆−i [σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )− ε
and hence, since ε > 0, s ∈ S and 1 6 i 6 2 were arbitrary, σn,⋆ is a subgame-
perfect ε-NE. It remains to show that the strategy profile is a subgame-perfect
social welfare optimal ε-NE, which follows from the fact that when solving the
bimatrix games during value iteration social welfare optimal NE are returned. ⊓⊔
It remains to consider the model checking algorithms for nonzero-sum properties
for which the sum of objectives contains both a finite-horizon and an infinite-
horizon objective. In this case (see Section 4.2.3), for a given game GC and sum of
objectives θ, the algorithms first build a modified game G′ with states S′ ⊆ S×N
and sum of infinite-horizon objectives θ′ and then computes SWNE/SCNE values
of θ′ in G′. The correctness of these algorithms follows by first showing there exists
Automatic Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Systems 35
a bijection between the profiles of GC and G′ and then that, for any profile σ of
GC and σ′, the corresponding profile of G′ under this bijection, we have:
E
σ
GC ,s(X
θ
i ) = E
σ′
G′,(s,0)(X
θ′
i )
for all states s of GC and 1 6 i 6 2. This result follows from the fact that in
Section 4.2.3 we used a standard construction for converting the verification of
finite-horizon properties to infinite-horizon properties.
6 Implementation and Tool Support
We have implemented support for modelling and automated verification of CSGs
in PRISM-games 3.0 [48], which previously only handled TSGs and zero-sum ob-
jectives [51]. The PRISM-games tool is available from [80] and the files for the
case studies, described in the next section, are available from [81].
6.1 Modelling
We extended the PRISM-games modelling language to support specification of
CSGs. The language allows multiple parallel components, called modules, operat-
ing both asynchronously and synchronously. Each module’s state is defined by a
number of finite-valued variables, and its behaviour is defined using probabilistic
guarded commands of the form [a] g → u, where a is an action label, g is a guard
(a predicate over the variables of all modules) and u is a probabilistic state up-
date. If the guard is satisfied then the command is enabled, and the module can
(probabilistically) update its variables according to u. The language also allows
for the specification of cost or reward structures. These are defined in a similar
fashion to the guarded commands, taking the form [a] g : v (for action rewards)
and g : v (for state rewards), where a is an action label, g is a guard and v is a
real-valued expression over variables.
For CSGs, we assign modules to players and, in every state of the model, each
player can choose between the enabled commands of the corresponding modules
(or, if no command is enabled, the player idles). In contrast to the usual behaviour
of PRISM, where modules synchronise on common actions, in CSGs action labels
are distinct for each player and the players move concurrently. To allow the up-
dates of variables to depend on the choices of other players, we extend the language
by allowing commands to be labelled with lists of actions [a1, . . . , an]. Moreover,
updates to variables can be dependent on the new values of other variables being
updated in the same concurrent transition, provided there are no cyclic dependen-
cies. This ensures that variables of different players are updated according to a
joint probability distribution. Another addition is the possibility of specifying “in-
dependent” modules, that is, modules not associated with a specific player, which
do not feature nondeterminism and update their own variables when synchronis-
ing with other players’ actions. Reward definitions are also extended to use action
lists, similarly to commands, so that an action reward can depend on the choices
taken by multiple players. For further details of the new PRISM-games modelling
language, we refer the reader to the tool documentation [80].
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Bimatrix Game
Actions SWNE values SCNE values
of each Solution time (s) Num. of Solution time (s) Num. of
player Yices Z3 NE in N Yices Z3 NE in N−
Covariant
games
2 0.04 0.06 1 0.2 1.1 1
4 0.04 0.1 3 0.04 0.1 3
8 0.3 2.7 13 0.3 1.8 21
12 8.3 77.0 15 11.0 130.2 45
16 764.8 4,238 103 318.6 2,627 109
Dispersion
games
2 0.04 0.08 3 0.04 0.08 3
4 0.05 0.2 51 0.04 0.1 15
8 1.8 16.4 6,051 0.2 1.1 255
12 6,368 t/o 523,251 6.0 38.3 4,095
Majority voting
games
2 0.03 0.08 5 0.03 0.07 2
4 0.05 0.1 15 0.04 0.1 13
8 0.5 1.0 433 0.2 0.7 186
12 9.9 22.4 3,585 9.9 16.0 3,072
16 532.5 2,386 61,441 465.9 2,791 49,153
Randomly generated
games
2 0.15 1.9 1 0.03 0.08 1
4 0.04 0.1 3 0.03 0.09 3
8 0.4 2.3 13 0.3 1.8 7
12 45.60 422.0 27 68.0 343.6 31
16 2,370 t/o 81 1,112 t/o 69
Table 1: Finding SWNE/SCNE values in bimatrix games: comparing SMT solvers.
6.2 Implementation
PRISM-games constructs a CSG from a given model specification and implements
the rPATL model checking and strategy synthesis algorithms from Section 4. We
extend existing functionality within the tool, such as modelling and property lan-
guage parsers, the simulator and basic model checking functionality. We build,
store and verify CSGs using an extension of PRISM’s ‘explicit’ model checking
engine, which is based on sparse matrices and implemented in Java. For strat-
egy synthesis we have included the option to export the generated strategies to a
graphical representation using the Dot language [31].
Computing values (and optimal strategies) of matrix games (see Section 2.1.1),
as required for zero-sum formulae, is performed using the LPSolve library [54] via
linear programming. This library is based on the revised simplex and branch-and-
bound methods. Computing SWNE or SCNE values (and SWNE or SCNE strate-
gies) of bimatrix games (see Section 2.1.2) for nonzero-sum formulae is performed
via labelled polytopes through a reduction to SMT. Currently, we implement this
in both Z3 [26] and Yices [28]. As an optimised precomputation step, when possible
we also search for and filter out dominated strategies, which speeds up computation
and reduces calls to the solver.
Since bimatrix games can have multiple SWNE values, when selecting SWNE
values of such games we choose the SWNE values for which the value of player
1 is maximal. In case player 1 is indifferent, i.e., their utility is the same for all
pairs, we choose the SWNE values which maximise the value of player 2. If both
players are indifferent, an arbitrary pair of SWNE values is selected.
Table 1 presents experimental results for the time to solve bimatrix games
using the Yices and Z3 solvers, as the numbers of actions of the individual games
vary. The table also shows the number of NE in each game N, as found when
determining the SWNE values, and also the number of NE in N−, as found when
determining the SCNE values (see Lemma 1). These games were generated using
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Player 1 strategy Player 2 strategy Utilities
prob. a1 prob. a2 prob. b1 prob. b2 (u1, u2)
0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 (0.0,4.0)
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 (1.0,4.0)
0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 (0.5,4.0)
1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.0,2.0)
1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 (1.0,2.0)
1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 (0.5,2.0)
0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 (0.0,3.0)
0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 (1.0,3.0)
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 (0.5,3.0)
Table 2: Possible NE strategies and utilities of the bimatrix game of Example 6.
GAMUT (a suite of game generators) [62] and a time-out of 2 hours was used for
the experiments. The results show Yices to be the faster implementation and that
the difference in solution time grows as the number of actions increases. Therefore,
in our experimental results in the next section, all verification runs use the Yices
implementation. The results in Table 1 also demonstrate that the solution time
for either solver can vary widely and depends on both the number of NE that
need to be found and the structure of the game. For example, when solving the
dispersion games, the differences in the solution times for SWNE and SCNE seem
to correspond to the differences in the number of NE that need to found. On the
other hand, there is no such correspondence between the difference in the solution
times for the covariant games.
Regarding the complexity of solving bimatrix games, if each player has n ac-
tions, then the number of possible assignments to the supports of the strategy pro-
files (i.e., the action tuples that are chosen with nonzero probability) is (2n−1)2,
which therefore grows exponentially with the number of actions, surpassing 4.2
billion when each player has 16 actions. This particularly affects performance in
cases where one or both players are indifferent with respect to a given support.
More precisely, in such cases, if there is an equilibrium including pure strategies
over these supports, then there are also equilibria including mixed strategies over
these supports as the indifferent player would get the same utility for any affine
combination of pure strategies.
Example 6. Consider the following bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( b1 b2
a1 1 0
a2 1 0
)
Z2 =
( b1 b2
a1 2 2
a2 4 4
)
Since the entries in the rows for the utility matrix for player 1 are the same and the
columns are the same for player 2, it is easy to see that both players are indifferent
with respect to their actions. As can be seen in Table 2, all (22−1)2 = 9 possible
support assignments lead to an equilibrium. 
For the task of computing non-optimal NE values, the large number of supports can
be somewhat mitigated by eliminating weakly dominated strategies [61]. However,
removing such strategies is not a straightforward task when computing SWNE or
SCNE values, since it can lead to the elimination of SWNE or SCNE profiles, and
hence also SWNE or SCNE values. For example, if we removed the row corre-
sponding to action a2 or the column corresponding to action b1 from the matrices
in Example 6 above, then we eliminate a SWNE profile. As the number of actions
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for each player increases, the number of NE profiles also tends to increase and so
does the likelihood of indifference. Naturally, the number of actions also affects
the number of variables that have to be allocated, and the number and complexity
of assertions passed to the SMT solver. As our method is based on the progressive
elimination of support assignments that lead to NE, it takes longer to find SWNE
and SCNE values as the number of possible supports grows and further constraints
are added each time an equilibrium is found.
7 Case Studies and Experimental Results
To demonstrate the applicability and benefits of our techniques, and to evaluate
their performance, we now present results from a variety of case studies. Supporting
material for these examples (models and properties) is available from [81]. These
can be run with PRISM-games 3.0 [48].
7.1 Efficiency and Scalability
We begin by presenting a selection of results illustrating the performance of our
implementation. The experiments were run on a 2.10 GHz Intel Xeon with 16GB
of JVM memory. In Table 3, we present the model statistics for the examples used:
the number of players, states, transitions and model construction times (details
of the case studies themselves follow in the next section). Due to improvements
in the modelling language and the model building procedure, some of the model
statistics differ from those presented in [45,46]. The main reason is that the earlier
version of the implementation did not allow for variables of different players to
be updated following a joint probability distribution, which made it necessary to
introduce intermediate states in order to specify some of the behaviour. Also, some
model statistics differ from [45] since models were modified to meet Assumptions 2
and 3 to enable the analysis of nonzero-sum properties.
Tables 4 and 5 present the model checking statistics when analysing zero-sum
and nonzero-sum properties, respectively. In both tables, this includes the maxi-
mum and average number of actions of each coalition in the matrix/bimatrix games
solved at each step of value iteration and the number of iterations performed. In
the case of zero-sum properties including reward formulae of the form F φ, value
iteration is performed twice (see Section 4.1.2), and therefore the number of iter-
ations for each stage are presented (and separated by a semi-colon). For zero-sum
properties, the timing statistics are divided into the time for qualitative (column
‘Qual.’) and quantitative verification, which includes solving matrix games (col-
umn ‘Quant.’). For nonzero-sum properties we divide the timing statistics into the
time for CSG verification, which includes solving bimatrix games (column ‘CSG’),
and the instances of MDP verification (column ‘MDP’). In the case of mixed
nonzero-sum properties, i.e., properties including both finite and infinite horizon
objectives, we must first build a new game (see Section 4.2.3); the statistics for
these CSGs (number of players, states and transitions) are presented in Table 6.
Finally, Table 7 presents the timing results for three nested properties. Here we
give the time required for verifying the inner and outer formula separately, as well
as the number of iterations for value iteration at each stage.
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Case study Param. Players States Transitions Constr.
[parameters] values time (s)
Robot coordination
[l]
4 2 226 6,610 0.1
8 2 3,970 201,650 1.0
12 2 20,450 1,221,074 3.9
16 2 65,026 4,198,450 11.8
24 2 330,626 23,049,650 62.5
Future markets
investors
[months]
6 3 34,247 144,396 1.5
12 3 257,301 1,259,620 8.3
24 3 829,125 4,318,372 25.4
36 3 1,400,949 7,377,124 59.3
48 3 1,972,773 10,435,876 70.3
Future markets
investors
[months,pbar ]
3,0.5 2 3,460 1,2012 0.3
6,0.5 2 29,703 12,4748 2.5
12,0.5 2 221,713 1,083,024 8.0
18,0.5 2 467,497 2,396,784 16.2
User-centric
networks
[td ,K]
1,3 7 32,214 121,659 2.1
1,4 7 104,897 433,764 6.1
1,5 7 294,625 1,325,100 17.5
1,6 7 714,849 3,465,558 42.8
Aloha (deadline)
[bmax,D]
1,8 3 3,519 5,839 0.2
2,8 3 14,230 28,895 0.5
3,8 3 72,566 181,438 2.1
4,8 3 413,035 1,389,128 9.4
5,8 3 2,237,981 9,561,201 58.4
Aloha
[bmax]
2 3 5,111 10,100 0.3
3 3 22,812 56,693 0.8
4 3 107,799 355,734 2.5
5 3 556,168 2,401,113 13.4
6 3 3,334,681 17,834,254 118.8
Intrusion detection
system
[rounds]
25 2 75 483 0.07
50 2 150 983 0.08
100 2 300 1,983 0.1
200 2 600 3,983 0.1
Jamming radio
systems
[chans,slots]
4,6 2 531 45,004 0.5
4,12 2 1,623 174,796 1.4
6,6 2 1,061 318,392 2.0
6,12 2 3,245 1,240,376 6.6
Medium access
control
[emax]
10 3 10,591 135,915 1.7
15 3 33,886 457,680 5.0
20 3 78,181 1,083,645 8.2
25 3 150,226 2,115,060 14.0
Medium access
control
[emax,smax]
4,2 3 14,723 129,097 2.2
4,4 3 18,751 147,441 4.3
6,4 3 122,948 1,233,976 11.0
6,6 3 138,916 1,315,860 12.5
Power control
[emax, powmax]
40,8 2 32,812 260,924 1.7
80,8 2 193,396 1,469,896 6.5
40,16 2 34,590 291,766 1.6
80,16 2 301,250 2,627,278 10.5
Table 3: Model statistics for the CSG case studies.
Our results demonstrate significant gains in efficiency with respect to those
presented for zero-sum properties in [45] and nonzero-sum properties in [46] (for
the latter, a direct comparison with the published results is possible since it uses an
identical experimental setup). The gains are primarily due to faster SMT solving
and reductions in CSG size as a result of modelling improvements, and specifically
the removal of intermediate states as discussed above.
The implementation can analyse models with over 3 million states and almost
18 million transitions; all are solved in under 2 hours and most are considerably
quicker. The majority of the time is spent solving matrix or bimatrix games, so
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Case study & property Param. Actions Val. Verif. time (s)
[parameters] values max/avg iters Qual. Quant.
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[¬c U
6kg1 ]
[l,k]
4,4 3,3/2.52,2.52 4 0.02 0.04
8,8 3,3/2.52,2.52 8 0.27 1.1
12,12 3,3/2.68,2.68 12 1.61 5.7
16,16 3,3/2.76,2.76 16 5.88 35.4
24,24 3,3/2.84,2.84 24 46.5 185.2
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1〉〉Rmin=?[ F g1 ]
[l]
4 3,3/2.52,2.52 10; 9 0.02 0.1
8 3,3/2.52,2.52 15; 14 0.35 4.1
12 3,3/2.68,2.68 20; 19 1.99 23.2
16 3,3/2.76,2.76 24; 24 7.57 96.5
24 3,3/2.84,2.84 34; 33 56.9 744.7
Future markets investors
〈〈i1〉〉Rmax=?[ F c1 ]
[months]
6 8,2/1.54,1.21 14; 14 1.3 6.0
12 8,2/1.68,1.27 26; 26 14.8 91.7
24 8,2/1.73,1.29 50; 50 94.3 616.0
36 8,2/1.74,1.29 74; 73 240.4 1,613
48 8,2/1.74,1.29 98; 97 395.4 2,770
User-centric networks
〈〈user〉〉Rmin=?[ F f ]
[td,K]
1,3 16,8/2.11,1.91 15; 1 1.4 182.3
1,4 16,8/2.31,1.92 21; 1 4.4 776.2
1,5 16,8/2.46,1.94 25; 1 14.4 2,456
1,6 16,8/2.60,1.96 29; 1 43.4 6,762
Aloha (deadline)
〈〈usr2, usr3〉〉Pmax=?[ F s1,2∧t6D ]
[bmax,D]
2,8 4,2/1.01,1.00 24 0.5 0.8
3,8 4,2/1.01,1.00 23 1.8 1.8
4,8 4,2/1.01,1.00 23 6.5 4.5
5,8 4,2/1.01,1.00 23 35.9 9.4
Aloha
〈〈usr2, usr3〉〉Rmin=?[ F sent2,3 ]
[bmax]
2 4,2/1.01,1.00 58; 47 0.2 2.1
3 4,2/1.01,1.00 71; 57 0.6 6.0
4 4,2/1.01,1.00 109; 86 3.7 33.7
5 4,2/1.01,1.00 193; 150 26.6 317.6
6 4,2/1.01,1.00 362; 279 314.5 3,836
Intrusion detection system
〈〈policy〉〉Rmin=?[ F r=rounds ]
[rounds]
25 2,2/1.96,1.96 26; 26 0.03 0.2
50 2,2/1.98,1.98 51; 51 0.06 0.7
100 2,2/1.99,1.99 101; 101 0.2 2.5
200 2,2/2.00,2.00 201; 201 0.5 7.0
Jamming radio systems
〈〈user〉〉Pmax=?[ F sent>slots/2 ]
[slots]
4,6 3,3/2.17,2.17 7 0.03 0.1
4,12 3,3/2.49,2.49 13 0.2 0.5
6,6 4,4/2.76,2.76 7 0.1 0.3
6,12 4,4/3.24,3.24 13 0.5 2.0
Table 4: Statistics for CSG zero-sum verification instances.
performance is affected by the number of choices available within each coalition,
rather than the number of players, as well as the number of states. For example,
larger instances of the Aloha models are verified relatively quickly since the coali-
tions have only one choice in many states (the average number of choices is 1.00
for both coalitions). However, for models where players have choices in almost all
states, only models with up to hundreds of thousands of states for zero-sum prop-
erties and tens of thousands of states for nonzero-sum properties can be verified
within 2 hours.
7.2 Case Studies
Next, we present more information about our case studies, to illustrate the appli-
cability and benefits of our techniques. We use some of these examples to illustrate
the benefits of concurrent stochastic games, in contrast to their turn-based coun-
terpart; here, we build both TSG and CSG models for the case study and compare
the results.
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Case study & property Param. Actions Val. Verif. time (s)
[parameters] values max/avg iters. MDP CSG
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max=?(P[¬c U
6kg1 ]+P[¬c U
6kg2 ])
[l,k]
4,4 3,3/2.07,2.07 4 0.02 0.1
8,8 3,3/2.52,2.52 8 0.45 1.0
12,12 3,3/2.68,2.68 12 6.25 5.8
16,16 3,3/2.76,2.76 16 34.7 22.2
24,24 3,3/2.84,2.84 24 375.2 1,365
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max=?(P[¬c U
6kg1 ]+P[¬c U g2 ])
[l,k]
4,8 3,3/2.10,2.04 21 0.16 3.3
4,16 3,3/2.12,2.05 21 0.28 12.0
8,8 3,3/2.53,2.51 34 5.51 77.2
8,16 3,3/2.54,2.52 35 17.2 3,513
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉min=?(R[ F g1 ]+R[ F g2 ])
[l]
4 3,3/2.07,2.07 8 0.05 0.2
8 3,3/2.52,2.52 15 0.44 10.3
12 3,3/2.68,2.68 23 2.12 227.7
16 3,3/2.84,2.84 28 12.1 3,272
Future markets investors
〈〈i1:i2〉〉max=?(R[ F c1 ]+R[ F c2 ])
[months]
3 2,2/1.15,1.15 6 0.1 0.2
6 2,2/1.22,1.22 13 0.8 3.1
12 2,2/1.27,1.27 25 9.1 284.7
18 2,2/1.29,1.29 37 31.6 4,326
Aloha (deadline)
〈〈usr1:usr2,usr3〉〉max=?(P[ F s1 ]+P[ F s2,3 ])
[bmax,D]
1,8 2,4/1.00,1.01 23 0.1 0.3
2,8 2,4/1.00,1.00 23 0.4 1.2
3,8 2,4/1.00,1.00 22 2.0 3.4
4,8 2,4/1.00,1.00 22 7.1 18.5
5,8 2,4/1.00,1.00 22 39.9 103.0
Aloha
〈〈usr1:usr2,usr3〉〉min=?(R[ F s1 ]+R[ F s2,3 ])
[bmax]
2 2,4/1.00,1.01 54 0.2 0.8
3 2,4/1.00,1.00 62 0.8 3.1
4 2,4/1.00,1.00 88 4.5 40.1
5 2,4/1.00,1.00 145 35.3 187.7
6 2,4/1.00,1.00 256 453.7 2,396
Medium access control
〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(R[ C
6k ]+R[ C6k ])
[emax,k ]
10,25 2,4/1.91,3.63 25 0.0 65.8
15,25 2,4/1.94,3.75 25 0.0 193.3
20,25 2,4/1.95,3.81 25 0.0 394.8
25,25 2,4/1.96,3.85 25 0.0 565.4
Medium access control
〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(P[ Fm1 ]+P[ Fm2,3 ])
[emax,smax]
4,2 2,4/1.70,2.88 10 0.61 96.2
4,4 2,4/1.64,2.70 12 0.61 22.8
6,4 2,4/1.77,3.12 17 7.40 1,639
6,6 2,4/1.74,3.02 18 4.09 93.6
Medium access control
〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(P[ F
6k m1 ]+P[ Fm2,3 ])
[emax,smax,k]
4,4,4 2,4/1.67,2.70 12 1.64 39.1
4,4,8 2,4/1.68,2.70 12 3.30 106.3
6,4,6 2,4/1.76,3.02 18 23.4 341.9
6,4,12 2,4/1.74,3.02 18 60.0 961.8
Power control
〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(R[ F e1=0 ]+R[ F e2=0 ])
[emax,powmax]
40,8 2,2/1.91,1.91 20 4.1 11.7
80,8 2,2/1.88,1.88 40 34.8 130.3
40,16 2,2/1.95,1.95 40 5.4 11.6
80,16 2,2/1.98,1.98 80 64.4 211.4
Power control
〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(R[ R[ F e1=0 ] ]+R[ C
6k ])
[emax,powmax,k ]
40,4,20 2,2/1.69,1.69 20 13.3 27.5
80,4,20 2,2/1.69,1.69 20 83.9 134.2
40,8,20 2,2/1.91,1.91 20 49.1 84.6
80,8,20 2,2/1.88,1.88 20 498.6 846.8
Table 5: Statistics for CSG nonzero-sum verification instances.
To study the benefits of nonzero-sum properties, we compare the results with
corresponding zero-sum properties. For example, for a nonzero-sum formula of
the form 〈〈C:C′〉〉max=?(P[ F φ1 ]+P[ F φ2 ]), we compute the value and an optimal
strategy σ⋆C for coalition C of the formula 〈〈C〉〉Pmax=?[ F φ1 ], and then find the
value of an optimal strategy for the coalition C′ for Pmin=?[ F φ2 ] and Pmax=?[ F φ2 ]
in the MDP induced by CSG when C follows σ⋆C . The aim is to showcase the
advantages of cooperation since, in many real-world applications, agents’ goals are
not strictly opposed and adopting a strategy that assumes antagonistic behaviour
can have a negative impact from both individual and collective standpoints.
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Case study Param. Players States Transitions
[parameters] values
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max=?(P[¬c U
6kg1 ]+P[¬c U g2 ])
[l,k]
4,8 2 1,923 56,385
4,16 2 3,491 104,545
8,8 2 36,773 1,860,691
8,16 2 67,525 3,443,443
Medium access control
〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(P[ F
6k m1 ]+P[ Fm2,3 ])
[emax ,smax ,k]
4,4,4 3 89,405 718,119
4,4,8 3 158,609 1,282,435
6,4,6 3 944,727 9,071,885
6,4,12 3 1,745,001 16,800,083
Power control
〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(R[ F e1=0 ]+R[ C
6k ])
[emax ,powmax ,k ]
40,4,20 2 182,772 1,040,940
80,4,20 2 917,988 5,153,700
40,8,20 2 524,473 4,179,617
80,8,20 2 3,806,240 28,950,948
Table 6: Model statistics for CSGs built verifying mixed nonzero-sum properties.
Case study
[parameters]
Param.
values
Inner Formula Outer Formula
Val. Verif. Val. Verif.
iters. time (s) iters. time (s)
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[ F φ ]
φ=〈〈rbt2〉〉R>10[ F g2 ] [l]
4 12; 12 0.1 5 0.1
8 22; 22 5.0 10 0.8
12 31; 30 40.5 10 2.6
16 40; 40 187.7 11 6.6
24 58; 58 1,235 12 22.6
Robot coordination
〈〈rbt1, rbt2〉〉Pmin=?[ F φ ]
φ=〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉min65(R[ F g1 ]+R[ F g2 ]) [l]
4 8 0.1 24 0.1
8 17 20.8 18 1.4
12 32 527.3 28 8.4
16 39 4,664 37 24.9
Aloha
〈〈usr1, usr2, usr3〉〉Pmax=?[ F φ ]
φ=〈〈usr1:usr2, usr3〉〉min>2(P[ F s1 ]+P[ F s2,3 ])
[bmax,D]
1,8 23 0.6 24 0.3
2,8 23 1.4 23 0.8
3,8 22 7.9 23 2.8
4,8 22 39.8 23 9.3
5,8 22 172.6 23 37.1
Table 7: Statistics for verification of nested properties for CSGs.
As will be seen, our results demonstrate that, by using nonzero-sum properties,
at least one of the players gains and in almost all cases neither player loses (in the
one case study where this is not the case, the gains far outweigh the losses). The
individual SWNE/SCNE values for players need not be unique and, for all case
studies (except Aloha and medium access in which the players are not symmetric),
the values can be swapped to give alternative SWNE/SCNE values.
Finally, we note that, for infinite-horizon nonzero-sum properties, we compute
the value of ε for the synthesised ε-NE and find that ε = 0 in all cases.
Robot Coordination. Our first case study concerns a scenario in which two robots
move concurrently over a grid of size l×l, briefly discussed in Example 5. The robots
start in diagonally opposite corners and try to reach the corner from which the
other starts. A robot can move either diagonally, horizontally or vertically towards
its goal. Obstacles which hinder the robots as they move from location to location
are modelled stochastically according to a parameter q (which we set to 0.25):
when a robot moves, there is a probability that it instead moves in an adjacent
direction, e.g., if it tries to moves north west, then with probability q/2 it will
instead move north and with the same probability west.
We can model this scenario as a two-player CSG, where the players correspond
to the robots (rbt1 and rbt2), the states of the game represent their positions on the
grid. In states where a robot has not reached its goal, it can choose between actions
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Fig. 3: Robot coordination on a 3×3 grid: probabilistic choices for one pair of
action choices in the initial state. Solid lines indicate movement in the intended
direction, dotted lines where there is deviation due to obstacles.
that move either diagonally, horizontally or vertically towards its goal (under the
restriction that it remains in the grid after this move). For i ∈ {1, 2}, we let goali
be the atomic proposition labelling those states of the game in which rbt i has
reached its goal and crash the atomic proposition labelling the states in which the
robots have crashed, i.e., are in the same grid location. In Figure 3, we present the
states that can be reached from the initial state of the game when l = 3, when the
robot in the south west corner tries to move north and the robot in the north east
corner tries to move south west. As can be seen there are six different outcomes
and the probability of the robots crashing is q2 ·(1−q).
We first investigate the probability of the robots eventually reaching their
goals without crashing for different size grids. In the zero-sum case, we find
the values for the formula 〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[¬crash U goal1 ] converge to 1 as l in-
creases; for example, the values for this formula in the initial states of game when
l = 5, 10 and 20 are approximately 0.9116, 0.9392 and 0.9581, respectively. On
the other hand, in the nonzero-sum case, considering SWNE values for the for-
mula 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max=?(P[¬crash U goal1 ]+P[¬crash U goal2 ]) and l > 4, we find
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Fig. 4: Robot coordination: probability of reaching the goal without crashing.
that each robot can reach its goal with probability 1 (since time is not an issue,
they can collaborate to avoid crashing).
We next consider the probability of the robots reaching their targets without
crashing within a bounded number of steps. Figure 4 presents both the value for
the (zero-sum) formula 〈〈rbt1〉〉Pmax=?[¬crash U
6k goal1 ] and SWNE values for the
formula 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉max>2(P[¬crash U
6k goal1 ]+P[¬crash U
6k goal2 ]), for a range of
step bounds and grid sizes. When there is only one route to each goal within the
bound (along the diagonal), i.e., when k = l−1, in the SWNE profile both robots
take this route. In odd grids, there is a high chance of crashing, but also a chance
one will deviate and the other reaches its goal. Initially, as the bound k increases,
for odd grids the SWNE values for the robots are not equal (see Figure 4 right).
Here, both robots following the diagonal does not yield a NE profile. First, the
chance of crashing is high, and therefore the probability of the robots satisfying
their objectives is low. Therefore it is advantageous for a robot to switch to a longer
route as this will increase the probability of satisfying its objective, even taking
into account that there is a greater chance it will run out of steps and changing
its route will increase the probability of the other robot satisfying its objective by
a greater amount (as the other robot will still be following the diagonal). Dually,
both robots taking a longer route is not an NE profile, since if one robot switches
to the diagonal route, then the probability of satisfying its objective will increase.
It follows that, in a SWNE profile, one robot has to follow the diagonal and the
other take a longer route. As expected, if we compare the results, we see that the
robots can improve their chances of reaching their goals by collaborating.
The next properties we consider concern the minimum expected number of
steps for the robots to reach their goal. In Figure 5 we have plotted the values
corresponding to the formula 〈〈rbt2〉〉R
rsteps
min=?[ F goal2 ] and SCNE values for the indi-
vidual players for 〈〈rbt1:rbt2〉〉min=?(R
rsteps [ F goal1 ]+R
rsteps [ F goal2 ]) as the grid size
l varies. The results again demonstrate that the players can gain by collaborating.
Futures market investors. This case study is a model of a futures market in-
vestor [56], which represents the interactions between investors and a stock market.
For the TSG model of [56], in successive months, a single investor chooses whether
to invest, next the market decides whether to bar the investor, with the restriction
that the investor cannot be barred two months in a row or in the first month, and
then the values of shares and a cap on values are updated probabilistically.
We have built and analysed several CSGs variants of the model, analysing
optimal strategies for investors under adversarial conditions. First, we made a
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Fig. 5: Robot coordination: expected steps to reach the goal.
single investor and market take their decisions concurrently, and verified that this
yielded no additional gain for the investor (see [81]). This is because the market
and investor have the same information, and so the market knows when it is
optimal for the investor to invest without needing to see its decision. We next
modelled two competing investors who simultaneously decide whether to invest
(and, as above, the market simultaneously decides which investors to bar). If the
two investors cash in their shares in the same month, then their profits are reduced.
We also consider several distinct profit models: ‘normal market’, ‘later cash-ins’,
‘later cash-ins with fluctuation’ and ‘early cash-ins’. The first is from [56] and the
remaining reward models either postponing cashing in shares or the early chasing
in of shares (see [81] for details). The CSG has 3 players: one for each investor and
one representing the market who decides on the barring of investors. We study
both the maximum profit of one investor and the maximum combined profit of
both investors. For comparison, we also build a TSG model in which the investors
first take turns to decide whether to invest (the ordering decided by the market)
and then the market decides on whether to bar any of the investors.
Figure 6 shows the maximum expected value over a fixed number of months
under the ‘normal market’ for both the profit of first investor and the combined
profit of the two investors. For the former, we show results for the formulae
〈〈i1〉〉R
profit1
max=?[ F cashed in1 ], corresponding to the first investor acting alone, and
〈〈i1, i2〉〉R
profit1,2
max=? [ F cashed in1,2 ] when in a coalition with the second investor. We
plot the corresponding results from the TSG model for comparison. Figure 7 shows
the maximum expected combined profit for the other two profit models.
When investors cooperate to maximise the profit of the first, results for the
CSG and TSG models coincide. This follows from the discussion above since all
the second investor can do is make sure it does not invest at the same time as
the first. For the remaining cases and given sufficient months, there is always a
strategy in the concurrent setting that outperforms all turn-based strategies. The
increase in profit for a single investor in the CSG model is due to the fact that, as
the investors decisions are concurrent, the second cannot ensure it invests at the
same time as the first, and hence decreases the profit of the first. In the case of
combined profit, the difference arises because, although the market knows when it
is optimal for one investor to invest, in the CSG model the market does not know
which one will, and therefore may choose the wrong investor to bar.
We performed strategy synthesis to study the optimal actions of investors. By
way of example, consider 〈〈i1 〉〉R
profit1
max=?[ F cashed in1 ] over three months and for a
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Fig. 6: Futures market investors: normal market.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Number of months
M
a
x
c
o
m
b
in
e
d
p
r
o
fi
t
CSG 〈〈i1, i2〉〉
TSG 〈〈i1, i2〉〉
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9
10
12.5
15
17.5
20
22.5
25
27.5
Number of months
M
a
x
c
o
m
b
in
e
d
p
r
o
fi
t
CSG 〈〈i1, i2〉〉
TSG 〈〈i1, i2〉〉
Fig. 7: Futures market: later cash-ins without (left) and with (right) fluctuations.
normal market (see Figure 6 left). The optimal TSG strategy for the first investor
is to invest in the first month (which the market cannot bar) ensuring an expected
profit of 3.75. The optimal (randomised) CSG strategy is to invest:
– in the first month with probability ∼0.4949;
– in the second month with probability 1, if the second investor has cashed in;
– in the second month with probability ∼0.9649, if the second investor did not
cash in at the end of the first month and the shares went up;
– in the second month with probability ∼0.9540, if the second investor did not
cash in at the end of the first month and the shares went down;
– in the third month with probability 1 (this is the last month to invest).
Following this strategy, the first investor ensures an expected profit of ∼4.33.
We now make the market probabilistic, where the probability the market bars
an individual investor equals pbar , and consider nonzero-sum properties of the
form 〈〈i1:i2〉〉max=?(R
profit1 [ F cashed in1 ]+R
profit2 [ F cashed in2 ]), in which each in-
vestor tries to maximise their individual profit, for different reward structures.
In Figures 8 and 9 we have plotted the results for the investors where the profit
models of the investors follow a normal profile and where the profit models of
the investors differ (‘later cash-ins’ for the first investor and ‘early cash-ins’ for
second), when pbar equals 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. The results demonstrate that,
given more time and a more predictable market, i.e., when pbar is lower, the players
can collaborate to increase their profits.
Performing strategy synthesis, we find that the strategies in the mixed profiles
model are for the investor with an ‘early cash-ins’ profit model to invest as soon
as possible, i.e., it tries to invest in the first month and if this fails because it is
barred, it will be able to invest in the second. On the other hand, for the investor
with the ‘later cash-ins’ profile, the investor will delay investing until the chances
of the shares failing starts to increase or they reach the month before last and then
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Fig. 8: Futures market: normal profiles (left) and mixed profiles (right) (pbar=0.1).
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Fig. 9: Futures market: normal profiles (left) and mixed profiles (right) (pbar=0.5).
invest (if the investor is barred in this month, they will be able to invest in the
final month).
Trust models for user-centric networks. Trust models for user-centric networks
were analysed previously using TSGs in [50]. The analysis considered the impact
of different parameters on the effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms between
service providers. The providers share information on the measure of trust for
users in a reputation-based setting. Each measure of trust is based on the service’s
previous interactions with the user (which previous services they paid for), and
providers use this measure to block or allow the user to obtain services.
In the original TSG model, a single user can either make a request to one of
three service providers or buy the service directly by paying maximum price. If the
user makes a request to a service provider, then the provider decides to accept or
deny the request based on the user’s trust measure. If the request was accepted,
the provider would next decide on the price again based on the trust measure, and
the user would then decide whether to pay for the service and finally the provider
would update its trust measure based on whether there was a payment. This
sequence of steps would have to take place before any other interactions occurred
between the user and other providers. Here we consider CSG models allowing
the user to make requests and pay different service providers simultaneously and
for the different providers to execute requests concurrently. There are 7 players:
one for the user’s interaction with each service provider, one for the user buying
services directly and one for each of the 3 service providers. Three trust models
were considered. In the first, the trust level was decremented by 1 (td = 1) when
the user does not pay, decremented by 2 in the second (td = 2) and reset to 0 in
the third (td = inf ).
Figure 10 presents results for the maximum fraction and number of unpaid
services the user can ensure for each trust model, corresponding to the formulae
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〈〈usr〉〉Rratio
−
min=?[ F finished ] and 〈〈usr〉〉R
unpaid−
min=? [ F finished ] (to prevent not requesting
any services and obtaining an infinite reward being the optimal choice of the user,
we negate all rewards and find the minimum expected reward the user can ensure).
The results for the original TSG model are included as dashed lines. The results
demonstrate that the user can take advantage of the fact that in the CSG model it
can request multiple services at the same time, and obtain more services without
paying before the different providers get a chance to inform each other about non-
payment. In addition, the results show that imposing a more severe penalty on
the trust measure for non-payment reduces the number of services the user can
obtain without paying.
Aloha. This case study concerns three users trying to send packets using the
slotted ALOHA protocol. In a time slot, if a single user tries to send a packet,
there is a probability (q) that the packet is sent; as more users try and send, then
the probability of success decreases. If sending a packet fails, the number of slots
a user waits before resending is set according to an exponential backoff scheme.
More precisely, each user maintains a backoff counter which it increases each time
there is a failure (up to bmax) and, if the counter equals k, randomly chooses the
slots to wait from {0, 1, . . . , 2k−1}.
We suppose that the three users are each trying to maximise the probability
of sending their packet before a deadline D, with users 2 and 3 forming a coali-
tion, which corresponds to the formula 〈〈usr1:usr2,usr3〉〉max=?P[ F (sent1 ∧ t6D) ]+
P[ F (sent2 ∧ sent3 ∧ t6D) ]. Figure 11 presents total values as D varies (left) and
individual values as q varies (right). Through synthesis, we find the collaboration
is dependent on D and q. Given more time there is a greater chance for the users
to collaborate by sending in different slots, while if q is large it is unlikely users
need to repeatedly send, so again can send in different slots. As the coalition has
more messages to send, their probabilities are lower. However, for the scenario
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with two users, the probabilities of the two users would still be different. In this
case, although it is advantageous to initially collaborate and allow one user to try
and send its first message, if the sending fails, given there is a bound on the time
for the users to send, both users will try to send at this point as this is the best
option for their individual goals.
We have also considered when the users try to minimise the expected time
before their packets are sent, where users 2 and 3 form a coalition, represented by
the formula 〈〈usr1:usr2,usr3〉〉min=?(R
time [ F sent1 ]+R
time [ F (sent2 ∧ sent3) ]). When
synthesising the strategies we see that the players collaborate with the coalition
of users 2 and 3, letting user 1 to try and send before sending their messages.
However, if user 1 fails to send, then the coalition either lets user 1 try again in
case the user can do so immediately, and otherwise the coalition attempts to send
their messages.
Finally, we have analysed when the players collaborate to maximise the proba-
bility of reaching a state where they can then send their messages with probability
1 within D time units (with users 2 and 3 in coalition), which is represented by
the formula 〈〈usr1,usr2,usr3〉〉Pmax=?[F 〈〈usr1:usr2,usr3〉〉min>2P[ F (sent1 ∧ t6D) ] +
P[ F (sent2 ∧ sent3 ∧ t6D) ]].
Intrusion detection policies. In [78], CSGs are used to model the interaction
between an intrusion detection policy and attacker. The policy has a number of
libraries it can use to detect attacks and the attacker has a number of different
attacks which can incur different levels of damage if not detected. Furthermore,
each library can only detect certain attacks. In the model, in each round the policy
chooses a library to deploy and the attacker chooses an attack. A reward structure
is specified representing the level of damage when an attack is not detected. The
goal is to find optimal intrusion detection policies which correspond to finding
a strategy for the policy that minimises damage, represented by synthesising a
strategy for the formula 〈〈policy〉〉Rdamagemin=? [ F (r = rounds) ]. We have constructed
CSG models with two players (representing the policy and the attacker) for the
two scenarios outlined in [78].
Jamming multi-channel radio systems.A CSGmodel for jamming multi-channel
cognitive radio systems is presented in [79]. The system consists of a number of
channels (chans), which can be in an occupied or idle state. The state of each chan-
nel remains fixed within a time slot and between slots is Markovian (i.e. the state
changes randomly based only on the state of the channel in the previous slot). A
secondary user has a subset of available channels and at each time-slot must decide
which to use. There is a single attacker which again has a subset of available chan-
nels and at each time slot decides to send a jamming signal over one of them. The
CSG has two players: one representing the secondary user and the other represent-
ing the attacker. Through the zero-sum property 〈〈user〉〉Pmax=?[ F (sent > slots/2) ]
we find the optimal strategy for the secondary user to maximize the probability
that at least half their messages are sent against any possible attack.
Medium Access Control. This case study extends the CSG model from Exam-
ple 4 to three users and assumes that the probability of a successful transmission
is dependent on the number of users that try and send (q1 = 0.95, q2 = 0.75 and
q3 = 0.5). The energy of each user is bounded by emax. We suppose the first user
acts in isolation and the remaining users form a coalition. The first nonzero-sum
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property we consider is 〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(R
sent1 [ C6k ]+Rsent2,3 [ C6k ]), which corre-
sponds to each coalition trying to maximise the expected number of messages they
send over a bounded number of steps. On the other hand, the second property is
〈〈p1:p2,p3〉〉max=?(P[ F
6k (mess1 = smax) ]+P[ F (mess2+mess3 = 2·smax) ]) and here
the coalitions try to maximise the probability of successfully transmitting a cer-
tain number of messages (smax for the first user and 2·smax for the coalition of
the second and third users), where in addition the first user has to do this in a
bounded number of steps (k).
Power Control. Our final case study is based on a model of power control in cel-
lular networks from [14]. In the model, phones emit signals over a cellular network
and the signals can be strengthened by increasing the power level up to a bound
(powmax). A stronger signal can improve transmission quality, but uses more energy
and lowers the quality of other transmissions due to interference. We extend this
model by adding a failure probability (qfail ) when a power level is increased and as-
sume each phone has a limited battery capacity (emax). Based on [14], we associate
a reward structure with each phone representing transmission quality dependent
both on its power level and that of other phones due to interference. We consider
the nonzero-sum property 〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(R
r1 [ F (e1 = 0) ]+R
r2 [ F (e2 = 0) ]), where
each user tries to maximise their expected reward before their phone’s battery
is empty. We have also analysed the property 〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(R
r1 [ F (e1 = 0) ] +
R
r2 [ C6k ]), where the objective of the second user is to instead maximise their
expected reward over a bounded number of steps (k).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have designed and implemented an approach for the automatic
verification of a large subclass of CSGs. We have extended the temporal logic
rPATL to allow for the specification of equilibria-based (nonzero-sum) properties,
where two players or coalitions with distinct goals can collaborate. We have then
proposed and implemented algorithms for verification and strategy synthesis us-
ing this extended logic, including both zero-sum and nonzero-sum properties, in
the PRISM-games model checker. In the case of finite-horizon properties the al-
gorithms are exact, while for infinite-horizon they are approximate using value
iteration. We have also extended the PRISM-games modelling language, adding
new features tailored to CSGs. Finally, we have evaluated the approach on a range
of case studies that have demonstrated the benefits of CSG models compared to
TSGs and of nonzero-sum properties as a means to synthesise strategies that are
collectively more beneficial for all players in a game.
The main challenge in implementing the model checking algorithms is effi-
ciently solving matrix and bimatrix games at each state in each step of value iter-
ation for zero-sum and nonzero-sum properties, respectively, which are non-trivial
optimisation problems. For bimatrix games, this furthermore requires finding an
optimal equilibrium, which currently relies on iteratively restricting the solution
search space. Solution methods can be sensitive to floating-point arithmetic issues,
particularly for bimatrix games; arbitrary precision representations may help here
to alleviate these problems.
There are a number of directions for future work. First, we plan to consider
additional properties such as multi-objective queries. We are also working on ex-
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tending the implementation to consider alternative solution methods (e.g., policy
iteration and using CPLEX [40] to solve matrix games) and a symbolic (binary
decision diagram based) implementation and other techniques for Nash equilibria
synthesis such as an MILP-based solution using regret minimisation. Lastly, we
are considering extending the approach to partially observable strategies, multi-
coalitional games, building on [47], and mechanism design.
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A Convergence of Zero-Sum Reachability Reward Formulae
In this appendix we give a witness to the failure of convergence for value iteration when
verifying zero-sum formulae with an infinite horizon reward objective if Assumption 1 does
not hold.
s1 s2
t
a1, a2
a1, a2
a1, b2
rA(s, (c1, c2)) =


−1 if s = s1 and (c1, c2) = (a1, a2)
1 if s = s2 and (c1, c2) = (a1, a2)
0 otherwise
rS(s) = 0 for all s
Fig. 12: Counterexample for zero-sum expected reachability reward properties.
Consider the CSG in Figure 12 with players p1 and p2 and the zero-sum state formula φ =
〈〈p1, p2〉〉Rrmax=?[ F a ], where a is the atomic proposition satisfied only by state t. Clearly, state
s1 does not reach either the target of the formula or an absorbing state with probability 1
under all strategy profiles, while the reward for the state-action pair (s1, (a1, a2)) is negative.
Applying the value iteration algorithm of Section 4, we see that the values for state s1 oscillate
between 0 and −1, while the values for state s2 oscillate between 0 and 1.
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B Convergence of Nonzero-Sum Probabilistic Reachability Properties
In this appendix we give a witness to the failure of convergence for value iteration when
verifying nonzero-sum formulae with infinite horizon probabilistic objectives if Assumption 2
does not hold.
s1 s2
t1 t2 t1 t2
c,⊥
⊥, cs,⊥ ⊥, s
1
4
3
4
3
4
1
4
Fig. 13: Counterexample for nonzero-sum probabilistic reachability properties.
Consider the CSG in Figure 13 with players p1 and p2 (an adaptation of a TSG example
from [12]) and the nonzero-sum state formula 〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(θ), where θ = P[ F a1 ]+P[ F a2 ]
and ai is the atomic proposition satisfied only by the state ti. Clearly, this CSG has a non-
terminal end component as one can remain in {s1, s2} indefinitely or leave at any time.
Applying the value iteration algorithm of Section 4, we have:
– In the first iteration VGC (s1, θ, 1) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c 0
s
1
4
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c 0
s
3
4
)
i.e. the values ( 1
4
, 3
4
), and VGC (s2, θ, 1) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥ 0 3
4
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥ 0 1
4
)
i.e. the values ( 3
4
, 1
4
).
– In the second iteration VGC (s1, θ, 2) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c
3
4
s
1
4
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c
1
4
s
3
4
)
i.e. the values ( 3
4
, 1
4
), and VGC (s2, θ, 2) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix games:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥
1
4
3
4
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥
3
4
1
4
)
i.e. the values ( 1
4
, 3
4
).
– In the third iteration VGC (s1, θ, 3) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c
1
4
s
1
4
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c
3
4
s
3
4
)
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i.e. the values ( 1
4
, 3
4
), and VGC (s2, θ, 3) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥
3
4
3
4
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥
1
4
1
4
)
i.e. the values ( 3
4
, 1
4
).
– In the fourth iteration VGC (s1, θ, 4) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c
3
4
s
1
4
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c
1
4
s
3
4
)
i.e. the values ( 3
4
, 1
4
), and VGC (s2, θ, 4) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥
3
4
3
4
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥
1
4
1
4
)
i.e. the values ( 3
4
, 1
4
).
As can be seen the values computed at each iteration for the states s1 and s2 will oscillate
between ( 1
4
, 3
4
) and ( 3
4
, 1
4
).
C Convergence of Nonzero-Sum Expected Reachability Properties
In this appendix we give a witness to the failure of convergence for value iteration when
verifying nonzero-sum formulae with infinite horizon reward objectives if Assumption 3 does
not hold.
s1 s2
t1 t2
c,⊥
⊥, c
s,⊥ ⊥, s
r1A(s, (a1, a2)) =


1
3
if s = s1 and (a1, a2) = (s,⊥)
2 if s = s2 and (a1, a2) = (⊥, s)
0 otherwise
r1S(s) = 0 for all s
r2A(s, (a1, a2)) =


1 if s = s1 and (a1, a2) = (s,⊥)
1
3
if s = s2 and (a1, a2) = (⊥, s)
0 otherwise
r2S(s) = 0 for all s
Fig. 14: Counterexample for nonzero-sum expected reachability properties.
Consider the CSG in Figure 14 with players p1 and p2 (which again is an adaptation of a
TSG example from [12]) and the nonzero-sum state formula 〈〈p1:p2〉〉max=?(θ), where θ =
R
r1 [ F a ]+Rr2 [ F a ] and a is the atomic proposition satisfied only by the states t1 and t2.
Clearly, there are strategy profiles for which the targets are not reached with probability 1.
Applying the value iteration algorithm of Section 4, we have:
– In the first iteration VGC (s1, θ, 1) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c 0
s
1
3
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c 0
s 1
)
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i.e. the values ( 1
3
, 1), and VGC (s2, θ, 1) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥ 0 2
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥ 0 1
3
)
i.e. the values (2, 1
3
).
– In the second iteration VGC (s1, θ, 2) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c 2
s
1
3
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c
1
3
s 1
)
i.e. the values (2, 1
3
), and VGC (s2, θ, 2) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix games:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥
1
3
2
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥ 1 1
3
)
i.e. the values ( 1
3
, 1).
– In the third iteration VGC (s1, θ, 3) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c
1
3
s
1
3
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c 1
s 1
)
i.e. the values ( 1
3
, 1), and VGC (s2, θ, 3) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥ 2 2
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥
1
3
1
3
)
i.e. the values (2, 1
3
).
– In the fourth iteration VGC (s1, θ, 4) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
(⊥
c 2
s
1
3
)
and Z2 =
(⊥
c
1
3
s 1
)
i.e. the values (2, 1
3
), and VGC (s2, θ, 4) are the SWNE values of the bimatrix game:
Z1 =
( c s
⊥
1
3
2
)
and Z2 =
( c s
⊥ 1 1
3
)
i.e. the values ( 1
3
, 1).
As can be seen the values computed during value iteration oscillate for both s1 and s2.
